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This work provides empirical evidence for a sizeable, statistically signicant negative
impact of the quality of scal institutions on public spending volatility for a panel of
25 EU countries over the 1980-2007 period. The dependent variable is the volatility of
discretionary scal policy, which does not represent reactions to changes in economic
conditions. Our baseline results thus give support to the strengthening of institutions
to deal with excessive levels of discretion volatility, as more checks and balances make it
harder for governments to change scal policy for reasons unrelated to the current state
of the economy. Our results also show that bigger countries and bigger governments have
less public spending volatility. In contrast to previous studies, the political factors do
not seem to play a role, with the exception of the Herndahl index, which suggests that
high concentration of parliamentary seats in a few parties would increase public spending
volatility.
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21 Introduction
In the last decades, we have seen a general increase in government budget decits along
with large levels of public debt in most developed countries. Although the literature has
focused on the main factors that help explain this deterioration of scal discipline, it has
not given much attention to questions related to the aggressive use of scal policy.
Against this background, governments have been using discretion in scal policy for
reasons not related to the current state of the economy, and this might increase the volatil-
ity of scal policy. In fact, scal policy is not conducted by benevolent governments, but
rather by politically motivated executives who do not necessarily share the same pref-
erences as those of the majority of society. For example, policies can be conducted for
politically questionable reasons, which in general benet only a minority of the popula-
tion. This component of scal policy (we call it discretionary scal policy, following Fat as
and Mihov (2003)), which may only reect politicians' incompetence, greediness, and the
opportunistic electoral and partisan cycles will be the object of interest in our work.
Following this line of thought, the volatility of public spending would certainly rise
with negative consequences for economic growth as it would produce high uncertainty
surrounding the future path of scal policies, hindering the public's perceptions of its
real eects and causing crowding-out eects on private consumption and investment.
Regarding this problem, the literature has been debating whether governments should
be constrained when conducting scal policy. Some (Levinson (1998) and Lane (2003))
defend that any kind of restrictions imposed on scal policy would reduce the ability of
governments to smooth business cycles, whilst others (Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), and
Fat as and Mihov (2003, 2006)) argue that the negative eects of high volatility caused
by discretionary scal policies would outpace, or at least cancel out, the negative impacts
related to less exibility to counteract shocks. This debate has led to the improvement of
budgetary procedures and rules, in several countries, towards strengthening institutions
in order to keep sound public nances.
In this work we want to nd out if there is any link between stronger scal institutions
(in line with the denitions in Fabrizio and Mody (2006), Hallerberg et al. (2007), and
3Debrun et al. (2008)), which are dened as the mechanisms and rules that create checks
and balances on scal policy, and lower values of public spending volatility. To the extent
that we only want to capture the volatility embedded in discretionary actions that are
simply the result of political motivations, we follow the denition for discretionary scal
policy of Fat as and Mihov (2003), who dene it as the component of scal policy that
does not represent reactions to changes in economic conditions and that may only reect
exogenous political preferences. The volatility of this measure is built by taking the
standard deviation of the residuals of a given scal reaction function.
In this context, our study adds to the \Fiscal Institutions" strand of literature in
four ways. Firstly, we apply indexes for the quality of institutions, both explicit and
implicit, to explain cross-country dierences in policy volatility. Secondly, we cover the
European Union (EU) countries, which oer several advantages, like larger span of data
availability for more variables, and data quality and cross-country comparisons are likely
to be of a high standard compared to samples with non-EU countries. Thirdly, we create
panels of 10-year averages for the econometric specication, and this allows us to draw
conclusions not only between countries as done by the majority of studies in this area
of research, such as Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), Fat as and Mihov (2003, 2006), Furceri
and Poplawski (2008), Afonso et al. (2010), but also over time, since we have, at most,
three observations per country and not just one point in time. Finally, we use dierent
measures of public spending and dierent specications for the scal reaction function as
robustness tests.
In a sample of 25 EU countries in the 1980-2007 period, our baseline results point
to a sizeable, statistically signicant negative impact of the quality of institutions on
public spending volatility, giving support to the strengthening of institutions to deal with
excessive levels of discretion volatility. Our results also conrm the ndings of Furceri and
Poplawski (2008) that bigger countries have less volatility, while bigger governments are
also associated with lower levels of volatility. In contrast with Fat as and Mihov (2003),
and Afonso et al. (2010), the political factors do not seem to aect policy volatility,
with the exception of the Herndahl index, which suggests that high concentration of
parliamentary seats in a few parties would increase public spending volatility.
4The results we get depend nevertheless, to some degree, on the measure used for
public spending. For instance, if we chose public consumption, a narrower measure of
public expenditure, instead of primary expenditure (used in the baseline), none of the
variables measuring the quality of institutions would be signicant.
The remainder of the text is organised as follows. The next section briey reviews
the related literature on the use of discretion in scal policy and on the debate about
the imposition of constraints on governments. Section 3 explains the empirical two-step
strategy that will be carried out. Section 4 presents and discusses the baseline results,
giving special focus to the quality of institutions. Under Section 5, we provide robustness
results using dierent measures of public spending and dierent specications for the
scal reaction function. Finally, Section 6 concludes with the main ndings and policy
implications, providing some avenues for future research.
2 Literature
2.1 Governments' use of discretionary scal policy
Over the years, many papers on scal policy, such as Persson and Tabellini (2001), Persson
(2002), Annett (2006), Fabrizio and Mody (2006), Hallerberg et al. (2007), Debrun et
al. (2008), and Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009), have studied the determinants behind
the systematic running of budget decits and consequent accumulation of large levels of
public debt, while others like Levinson (1998), Lane (2003), and Fat as and Mihov (2006,
2010), have focused on the cyclicality of scal policy, i.e. the ability of governments to
react against output shocks. Though a few papers have addressed issues related to policy
volatility, the literature on the volatility of discretionary scal policy is still scarce (see the
pioneer works of Fat as and Mihov (2003, 2006), and also Afonso et al. (2010)). Moreover,
studies in this area for EU countries are even scarcer.
In our work, we follow Fat as and Mihov (2003), who dene discretionary scal policy
as the component of scal policy that is the result of exogenous preferences, unrelated
to changes in economic conditions. The other two components of scal policy, which we
5do not cover in this work, are: automatic scal stabilisers, which consist of automatic
responses of scal policy based on tax code and spending rules, to changes in GDP, and
discretionary scal policy that responds to the state of the economy.
We pursue a growing literature which brings economics and politics together to under-
stand policy, and which has brought to the debate the idea that scal policy is not con-
ducted by benevolent governments who have political motivations and seek the achieve-
ment of personal goals. That sort of behaviour would ultimately lead to bad macroeco-
nomic policies, particularly to undesired volatility to the economy. We want to stress at
the outset that it is this volatility, caused by discretionary use of scal policy to achieve
targets other than stabilising the economy, which do not respond to shocks, that we
propose to study. This politically motivated discretionary scal policy contrasts with
discretionary scal policy (\discretionary" as opposed to the operation of automatic sta-
bilisers) that responds to economic shocks. For instance, a wide range of scal stimulus
measures undertaken by governments to tackle the international nancial and economic
crisis, which began in late 2007, does not fall into the former category, as it aims to miti-
gate the adverse eects of the crisis. Moreover, although structural reforms are generally
considered as being part of discretionary scal policies that do not respond to changes in
GDP, we do not want to capture the volatility brought on by these reforms as they do
not really reect opportunistic decisions conducted by governments.
Turning now to the reasons behind the use of discretion in scal policy, politicians can
be motivated by personal objectives, generating too much volatility compared to what
would be created if governments had only reacted to shocks suered by the economy. This
subject is intrinsically related to the emergence of the budget decit bias, that is, too
many decits run by governments without adding signicant growth to the economy. The
\political economy" literature has advanced several factors as being behind the increased
willingness of governments to resort to discretion in the conduct of scal policy, thus
augmenting its volatility, as follows.
The opportunistic electoral cycle (Nordhaus (1975), and Rogo and Sibert (1988))
arises when politicians in power run expansionary scal policy in times when it is not
necessary, in order to maximize their chances for re-election.This behaviour is motivated
6by voters' scal illusion, which tends to delude citizens to privilege the short-term ben-
ets they can get from lower taxes and higher public spending, at the expense of more
sustainable long-term policies.
Similarly, idiosyncratic changes, incompetence and greediness, as argued by Stokey
(2002), can foster large swings in the conduct of policies, generating excessive volatility
without any gains to macroeconomic growth.
The partisan electoral cycle advanced by Alesina (1987) can also help explain why
some countries use more discretion in the conduct of scal policy. In his view, changes
in policy may result from changes in the ideology of parties in power.
Finally, discretionary scal policy may stem as well from non-adjustment or delayed
adjustment to shocks due to the inability to build coalitions. This behaviour is charac-
teristic of proportional systems where the diculty in forming majority governments by
building coalitions with others parties, along with scal deadlocks, might delay stabilisa-
tion, increasing the volatility of scal policy (Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)).
There is some evidence in the literature regarding the negative eects on the economy
of this excessive volatility generated by the aggressive use of discretion in scal policy.
For example, Fat as and Mihov (2003, 2006), and Badinger (2008) document that output
volatility is bigger in the presence of high levels of discretionary scal policy, exacerbating
the business cycle. Moreover, Ramey and Ramey (1995), Fat as and Mihov (2003), and
Afonso and Furceri (2010) document that government spending volatility is detrimental
to economic growth. In this context, what can be done? The debate around constraining
scal policy discretion is therefore taken up in the next section.
2.2 The need to restrain scal policy discretion
The problems which may arise from the aggressive use of scal policy discretion,1 such as
macroeconomic instability, raise some questions about whether tying governments' hands
produces better outcomes than the option of leaving governments' actions unrestricted.
In contrast to monetary policy, which was taken away from governments and was
1Although we are critics of the use of politically motivated discretionary scal policy, we acknowledge
that some degree of discretion in scal policy may be very useful provided that it responds to shocks.
7given to independent central banks to improve discipline and eliminate the inationary
bias, there is not yet any consensus among policy-makers for restricting the ability of
governments to use scal policy in an aggressive way. Nevertheless, this issue of \rules
versus discretion", which is the trade-o between discipline and exibility, has been in
the forefront of the public debate, particularly in EU countries, where (since the creation
of the single currency) policy-makers have only had scal policy at their disposal to
implement and to conduct their own policies.
Following this line of thought, a growing body of literature has moved towards
strengthening budgetary institutions, i.e. the mechanisms and rules governing the budget
process that create checks and balances over public nances. This sudden interest in
improving the quality of institutions is reinforced by the following aspects. First, there
has been a sustained idea that institutions aect policy preferences directly, in the sense
that limitations contained in the legislation condition the conduct of scal policy. Second,
the decit bias could be eliminated or reduced with a proper design of the institutional
environment. Finally, improving the quality of institutions could drive up economic per-
formance, as pointed out by Henisz (2000) who has built a measure of political constraints
that is found to have positive eects on economic growth.
The debate on constraining scal policy discretion has nevertheless been controversial.
Defenders of the use of discretionary actions in scal policy without restrictions argue
that any sort of constraints having the ability to limit the intervention of the authorities
in the economy would exacerbate the amplitude of business cycles. Levinson (1998) and
Lane (2003) argued that restrictions on scal policy tend to produce more pro-cyclical
scal policy. In particular, Levinson (1998) found evidence for economic costs in the US
states in the form of increased business cycle volatility, as a result of tying government's
hands, reducing therefore their ability to smooth out economic cycle uctuations.
On the other hand, there is a plethora of economists, like Poterba (1994), Alesina
and Bayoumi (1996), and Fat as and Mihov (2003, 2006), advocating that politicians
could not conduct scal policy of their free will because they would run high decits
and generate too much volatility in the economy. Consequently, scal policy can be a
source of macroeconomic instability, even though it can also be a powerful tool to expand
8the rate of economic growth in the short run. Only by imposing tight restrictions on
governments, either explicit or implicitly, is it possible to eliminate, or at least reduce,
the possibility of scal policy being itself a source of economic instability.
Against this background, the chain through which policy volatility aects economic
growth starts with the political and institutional setup underlying the conduct of dis-
cretionary scal policy, which in turn aects output volatility, and this will determine,
to some degree, the rate of growth of the economy (Fat as and Mihov (2003)). If one
country had tighter institutional constraints, it would have more stable policy, and as
a result would create the ideal conditions for a greater stability in the levels of private
investment, as rms would be able to more accurately predict the path of public spend-
ing. This would promote further stability in output volatility as investment is one of the
most volatile components, and nally would generate a more favourable environment for
economic growth. Therefore, strengthening the quality of institutions would be the key
to deal with the abusive use of scal policy.
The proposals to strengthen the quality of institutions range from simple measures
to increase governments' accountability and policies' transparency, to more radical ones
such as changes in policy-making by delegating the power to determine the size of the
budget decit to an independent scal policy committee (Wyplosz (2005)).2 Others have
studied the implementation of scal controls in the form of numerical scal rules applied
to the budget balance and to its aggregates (Debrun et al. (2008)), and to procedural
rules governing the budget process (Gleich (2003), Yl aoutinen (2004), Fabrizio and Mody
(2006), and Hallerberg et al. (2007)). All these authors consider that the behaviour of
scal policy depends on the institutional settings under which policy is implemented and
thus, constraints can be eective in improving scal discipline.
Going deeper into the subject of restrictions, the literature has come up with the
terms \Political or Fiscal Institutions" or simply \Institutions", to refer to various char-
acteristics of the socio-economic and political setup of a given country, which considerably
shape economic policy (Persson and Tabellini (2001), and Persson (2002)). This set of
2The creation of independent scal policy councils/committees has recently been in the forefront of
the debate in dealing with scal indiscipline. See for example the contributions from CEPR (2010).
9characteristics entails dierent types of restrictions covering a variety of topics of the
political and institutional arrangement. They assume the form of explicit limits, such
as scal rules, or the form of implicit limits, like procedural rules governing the budget
process, the nature of the electoral and political system, ideological preferences, party
concentration in parliament, number of elections, among others.
The main restrictions that are in force in many EU countries, which represent the
quality of institutions, and which we expect to have a role in explaining dierences in
policy volatility among these countries, will be briey explained in the next two sub-
sections. We group them into two main categories: numerical scal rules, representing
the explicit limits, and scal governance, representing the implicit ones.
2.2.1 Numerical scal rules
In the context of an increasing integration of countries in the Economic Monetary Union
(EMU), eorts have been made to improve discipline in public nances. Despite the
growing criticism and scepticism over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), it appears
to have had some positive results in controlling budget decits and public debt up to
2007.
Nonetheless, this improvement could be due more to the eectiveness of scal rules
implemented at a national level, or to other country-specic restrictions, rather than the
merit of the SGP rules. For instance, at the national level, we can encounter budget
balance and debt rules, which continue to be by far the most popular type of rules in
the EU countries; at a smaller scale, we can also nd rules applied on expenditures and
revenues aiming to rebalance the composition of the budget by setting a cap on the annual
growth rate of determined expenditure categories, and at the same time, by taking action
to avoid an excessive tax burden. In general, those scal rules were implemented to take
care of the decit bias, the massive amounts of indebtedness, and to a lesser extent to
\oblige" countries to pursue counter-cyclical scal policies, especially in good times.
The study of the eects of scal rules on policy outcomes is vast. For instance, Debrun
et al. (2008) built a \Fiscal rule index", which covers numerical scal rules implemented
at a national level in EU countries, pointing to a signicant positive impact of the index
10on scal discipline. Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) in a study for the EU countries have
also used the \Fiscal rule index" to show that a well-dened and appropriate institutional
design of scal rules may help promote scal consolidation and can help attain a sustain-
able scal position. For the US, Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) stressed the important role
played by scal rules in improving scal discipline, and Fat as and Mihov (2006) found
that states that apply a no carryover rule3 experience less policy volatility.
2.2.2 Fiscal governance
A growing body of empirical and theoretical literature that has dealt with issues related
to the quality of institutions has also focused on implicit constraints underlying the three
phases of the budget process: (i) the Preparation stage, in which the budget draft is
elaborated; (ii) the Approval stage, in which the budget draft is reviewed, approved and
then formalised; and (iii) the Implementation stage, where the budget is implemented and
which may be subjected to modications or amendments by the minister of nance and/or
by the parliament. They consider these set of scal governance variables as complements
to numerical scal rules rather than mutually exclusive, since strengthening institutions
requires both improvements in procedural rules and in ex-ante scal rules.
We expect stronger institutions with more checks and balances to have positive eects
in constraining discretion in scal policy, i.e. we are led to believe that countries with
better and more developed institutions face more diculties to change scal policy for
reasons not related to the current state of the economy. In fact, the literature has found
evidence for a direct relationship between tight procedural rules surrounding the budget
process and scal discipline (see for example Hallerberg et al. (2007)).
Other types of (implicit) restrictions that have been studied relate to the nature
of the political and electoral system, the inuence of elections, party concentration in
parliament, the instability of governments, among others. Persson and Tabellini (2001),
and Persson (2002) constitute a remarkable approach on some of these issues for a large
sample of countries.
3States having this type of rule cannot carry over a budget decit to the next budget year.
113 Empirical strategy
After dealing with the theoretical aspects of discretionary scal policy, we propose to
study the main determinants of its volatility through a two-step strategy. Firstly, we
extract from each country the exogenous component of scal policy that is not related to
the current state of the economy. Secondly, we employ our measure of the volatility of
discretionary scal policy as the dependent variable against a set of political, institutional
and macroeconomic variables. From now on, the terms public spending volatility, (scal)
policy volatility, and discretionary scal policy volatility will be used interchangeably
throughout the text.
3.1 First-stage regressions: discretionary scal policy measure
Our sample covers 25 EU member states over the period 1980-2007.4 Using this sample of
countries oers several advantages. In particular, we have a larger span of data availability
for more variables than those that would be obtained from non-EU countries. In addition,
data quality and cross-country comparisons are likely to be of a higher standard.
We use annual data from the European Commission (EC) AMECO database for
all scal and macroeconomic variables. Data on the political variables come from the
Database of Political Institutions (DPI 2006) of the World Bank, while data on the
institutional ones are from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS).
Turning now to the empirical strategy, in the rst stage, we want to build a measure
of discretionary scal policy that is driven by political and personal motivations, which
do not constitute changes as a result of the eects of the economic cycle on scal policy.
To do this, we need to separate the cyclical component of scal policy, i.e. the endogenous
response to changing economic conditions which are largely outside the control of scal
authorities (discretionary scal policy that responds to shocks), from exogenous (struc-
tural) changes in policy stance (politically motivated discretionary scal policy). This
latter component can be thought of as a shock to the economy that is harmful to growth.
Separating these components of scal policy, however, turns out to be a hard task.
4Bulgaria and Cyprus were dropped due to data availability problems.
12The diculty lies in the simultaneity in the determination of output and the budget.5
To reduce this endogeneity bias we use spending variables rather than revenues or the
budget balance. This choice is justied by the fact that expenditures react much less to
the cycle than revenues; in fact, uctuations in revenues result, to a large extent, from
the automatic reaction of tax revenues to the state of the economy.6
We rely on the pioneering7 work of Fat as and Mihov (2003), who consider the resid-
uals from a regression of government consumption growth on output growth, lagged
government consumption growth and on other controls, as a quantitative estimate of
discretionary scal policy. Though following their econometric approach, we do not use
real public consumption as the baseline measure of public spending, but rather we use
real primary government expenditure as the dependent variable, which is more compre-
hensive. Their choice of public consumption (also used by Afonso et al. (2010)) as the
indicator of scal policy was dictated by data availability, since it is dicult to gather
internationally comparable data for broader measures of government spending for a large
panel of countries (91 countries in the rst paper, 132 in the second). By using a broader
measure of government spending, we can have more condence in the generality of our
results. Still, for the sake of comparison with the literature's results elsewhere, we also
provide results in the case of government consumption as the measure of scal policy.
From an econometric point of view, we estimate for each of the 25 EU countries over
the 1980-2007 period, the following equation in the spirit of Fat as and Mihov (2003,
2006):
log(Gi;t) = i + ilog(Yi;t) + ilog(Gi;t 1) + iZi;t + i;t (1)
where  is the rst dierence operator, G stands for real primary government expenditure
in country i and time t, Y is real GDP, and Z includes a set of control variables, namely,
ination, ination squared, the logarithm of current and lagged oil spot prices, and a
5See Alesina and Perotti (1996) for a survey of some proposals of the literature aiming to capture
the exogenous component of scal policy.
6For example, Afonso et al. (2010) found that revenue reacts more to changes in output than gov-
ernment spending, while spending seems to be more persistent than revenue.
7In spite of the fact that other papers had already treated these residuals as a government spending
shock (for example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002)), the truth is that, to our knowledge, Fat as and Mihov
(2003) were the rst to centre the analysis on the aggressiveness of discretionary scal policy.
13linear time trend. Ination is included to ensure that our results are not driven by
high ination episodes and to control for the possibility that specic spending items are
indexed automatically to the ination rate. The inclusion of ination squared is justied
by the possible existence of a nonlinear relationship between ination and government
outlays. In turn, oil prices are included because they aect the state of the economy,
whilst the inclusion of a linear time trend is vindicated by the argument that government
spending might also have a deterministic time trend in addition to the stochastic one.
The possible reverse causality bias running from public expenditure via domestic
demand to output growth is accounted for by using the instrumental variables (IV) es-
timator. We use two lags of GDP growth, lagged ination and the logarithm of oil spot
price as instruments for current output growth.
Finally, and more importantly, the volatility of residuals (i;t) can be seen as a quanti-
tative estimate of discretionary scal policy. The volatility is calculated as the standard
deviation of the residuals in country i, and we interpret sigma (
i) as the typical size of
a discretionary change in scal policy.
As a robustness test, we also provide another way of calculating the measure of dis-
cretionary scal policy by resorting to a dierent equation (Fat as and Mihov (2010)).
Equation (2) therefore presents a scal policy reaction function, commonly used in the
literature, where government spending reacts to cyclical uctuations, past developments
in public debt, and to its own past values:
Gi;t = i + iGapi;t + iDi;t 1 + iGi;t 1 + !i;t (2)
where G is the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure (CAPE),8 Gap is the output
gap measured as the dierence between actual and potential output at constant market
prices, whereas D is gross government debt. All variables are expressed in percentage of
potential output, computed according to the production function method.
To avoid the possibility of endogeneity bias, we instrument for the output gap using
two lags of the own output gap, lagged ination and the logarithm of oil spot price.
8We also use consumption expenditure in percentage of potential GDP. Yet, it is not cyclically
adjusted since its components are usually regarded as not responding automatically to the cycle.
14Again, we interpret the country-specic volatility of the error term (!
i ), as the typical
size of a discretionary change in scal policy for country i.
Going further ahead, we have computed the standard deviation using periods of 10
years, since we want to capture long-term uctuations in discretionary scal policy, re-
moving therefore the noise that might exist in the short-term.9
Taking our baseline measure of the volatility of discretionary scal policy, i.e. obtained
by employing primary expenditure as dependent variable in Equation (1), Figure 1 of
Appendix C presents the calculated volatilities (expressed in standard deviations) of
discretionary scal policy for each country and decade. In the 1980s, we only have
data available for the former EU-15 countries, with policy volatility ranging between a
maximum of 10.1 (Greece) and a minimum of 1.1 (Netherlands). Adding one more decade,
and including three new countries (Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia), does not signicantly
change the overall picture presented in the previous decade. Finally, in the last decade,
we cover all the 25 countries, where the discretion measure ranges between 6.7 (Latvia)
and 0.7 (Poland). Overall, over time, the charts show a slight downward trend in the use
of discretionary scal policy across countries, albeit with some exceptions.
3.2 Second-stage regressions: determinants of policy volatility
After having built our measure of discretionary scal policy volatility, we now focus our
attention on the proxies for the quality of institutions, which we expect can contribute
to explain cross-country dierences in policy volatility: the Fiscal rule index (FRI) and
the Delegation index, and their respective sub-categories.
The FRI, which is taken from Debrun et al. (2008), is restricted to scal rules that
x targets or ceilings to budgetary aggregates expressed in numerical terms. The nal
objective is to cover all numerical scal rules in force that somehow restrain the conduct
of scal policy, while at the same time try to measure its relative strength (degree of
9Taking into account the way we have computed our measure of policy volatility, one may argue that
structural reforms may be present in the volatility induced by politically motivated discretionary scal
policy measures undertaken by governments, which do not react to the business cycle. In this context,
we acknowledge that this may be a caveat to our work. The working hypothesis that we have assumed,
however, has considered that structural reforms are likely to gradually fade away over the decade, which
implies that we will only capture relatively small values of volatility coming from these reforms.
15eectiveness). One additional advantage is that, in contrast to most of the other pa-
pers, the index may vary over time and not only across countries.10 The literature has
found statistically signicant positive eects of this index on budget outcomes, as we
have stressed in Section 2.2.1. In this context, we expect that they may also work as
a means to diminish discretionary scal policy volatility, preventing large deviations in
scal policy. As stated by Kopits (2001), rules \seek to confer credibility on the conduct
of macroeconomic policies by removing discretionary intervention".
Regarding the Delegation index, we would want to demonstrate to what extent im-
plicit constraints, in addition to explicit rules, faced by policy-makers in the various
phases of the budget process, which help improve the quality of institutions, aect policy
volatility. We base our reasoning on the nding that stronger institutions do not allow
governments to abruptly change scal policy for reasons not related to the business cycle.
The construction of our index of Delegation, and of its sub-components, the Prepa-
ration, Approval and Implementation indexes, are based on the works on the so-called
scal governance variables of Hallerberg et al. (2007), and Fabrizio and Mody (2008).
The complete list of items and institutional scores constituting the index are shown in
Table 11 of Appendix B. The construction of these indexes assumes that individual in-
stitutional features are perfect substitutes, so we add up all institutional items assuming


















xi; xi = items 7 to 10 of Table 11 (5)
Taking the simple average of the sum of each institutional phase, we obtain:
Delegation index =
Prepar. index+Approv. index + Implem. index
3
(6)
10See Appendix B for a brief explanation on how the index is built. For a thorough explanation of all
topics covered in the survey, and its technical aspects, see Appendix 1 in Debrun et al. (2008) or Chapter
3 of Part III in European Commission (2006).
16Table 12 summarises the data on the Delegation index and on the FRI for each country
and for each of the three decades considered, after being normalised to zero mean and
standard deviation equal to one. Firstly, a country with high numerical scal rules
does not necessarily have tighter controls over the budget process. In fact, the simple
correlation between the FRI and the Delegation index is not very signicant, reaching
almost 0.3 in the 1990s and around -0.1 in the last decade. For example, in the 2000s,
Denmark and Finland have lower levels of the Delegation index but high values of the
FRI, while Ireland and Greece are good examples of the opposite case. Secondly, over
the last decade, there has been a broad based increase in the quality of institutions.
Moving to the econometric specication for the second-stage regression, we tried to
include all the variables and controls that might be important to explain dierences in
policy volatility between countries. Taking the logarithm of policy volatility, calculated
in Section 3.1, as the dependent variable of interest, we perform the following regression
by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
log(

i;t) = i + iFRIi;t + iDelindexi;t + iPoli;t + iInsti;t + iMi;t + i;t (7)
where FRI is the Fiscal rule index, while Delindex reects our measure of the Delegation
index.11 Pol includes all the political variables that shape budget outcomes, namely the
nature of the electoral system (governments elected by proportional representation or
by majoritarian circles), the number of parliamentary elections to capture the possible
presence of a political budget cycle, an index of electoral competitiveness that may help
improve checks and balances and political stability, and the Herndahl index that mea-
sures the concentration of power in the parties (higher values mean higher concentration





No. of seats of partyi
Total seats
2
; 0  Herf. index  1 (8)
Contrary to most of the literature focusing on political variables, it was not possible to
11In addition to the FRI and the Delegation index, we also use the sub-categories of both indexes.
17use the nature of the political regime (parliamentary versus presidential regimes) owing to
few dierences between EU countries. In our sample, indeed, only Lithuania and Poland
have presidential regimes. This political feature makes more sense in a large international
sample of countries where there are large dierences in the prevailing political regime.
The occurrence of political crises that may remove from power a particular government
and the instability that many cabinet changes might bring to the executive is captured
by the vector Inst, which includes the variables government crises and cabinet changes.
We have also included some macroeconomic control variables found by the literature
to be of potential importance for explaining budget outcomes. The vector M comprises
the following variables: GDP per capita to capture income eects, government size to
control for the stabilising role of scal policy, country size and dependency ratio to capture
key social characteristics that aect policy volatility, openness to control for the degree
of exposure of economies to external shocks, ination to control for the possibility that
high ination episodes could make large deviations in discretionary public spending as
a result of higher price volatility and uncertainty, and dummies for the run-up to EMU,
for countries constrained by the SGP and for new members of the EU, the Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEEC), in order to assess the relevance of the dierent
stage of each country in the integration process.
Regarding the econometric estimation method, our data, however, does not allow us to
employ common panel data estimators, such as xed and random eects estimators, since
we have some variables, such as political and scal governance variables, with little or no
time variation at all within each country.12 For example, using the xed eects estimator
would lead the model to drop some time-invariant variables, reducing the availability of
non-zero observations. For these variables, heterogeneity is mainly found between coun-
tries and not within countries. So, to account for the potential problem of heterogeneity,
we include in Equation (7) a large set of other variables aiming to capture cross-sectional
heterogeneity, and by doing so, we also minimise the risk of an omitted variable bias.
Another problem posed by our estimation refers to the fact that the dependent vari-
12We also tried to employ time-eects dummies, but we were forced to drop them from the regressions,
since they proved to be insignicant in most regressions.
18able is estimated rather than observed. According to Furceri and Poplawski (2008), the
regression residuals obtained from the rst stage can be thought of as having two com-
ponents: sampling error, the dierence between the true value of the dependent variable
and the estimated one; and the random shock in the residual term that would have re-
mained even if such deviations had not occurred, i.e. the structural innovations in the
endogenous variables. This fact would lead to higher standard deviations, lowering the
t-statistics and thus reducing the overall quality of our results.
To minimise this problem, we use panel-corrected standard errors when computing
the standard errors of the estimates. This method assumes that the disturbances of the
variance-covariance estimates are heteroskedastic (each country has its own variance)




In this section, we perform empirical estimations for the EU countries using Equation
(7). We create a panel of three consecutive, non-overlapping 10-year averages from 1980
to 2007 (we will have, at most, three observations per country).13 With this method of
pooling observations (pooled OLS), we address the time-variation in our data series,
which reect not only cross-country but also within-country variation. We estimate
Equation (7) by OLS with panel-corrected standard errors. In some tables, generally
the last column(s), we also perform estimations using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
to account for possible reverse causality running from policy volatility to institutions.
In our work it is not only possible to exploit the eects of explicit constraints on policy
volatility (numerical scal rules) but also implicit restrictions (scal governance, polit-
ical and institutional variables). We therefore extend the analysis of Fat as and Mihov
(2003), who have only focused on implicit restrictions (index of political constraints con-
13The rst decade goes from 1980 to 1989, the second from 1990 to 1999, and the last decade uses
the last 8 years in our data set.
19structed by Henisz (2000), the nature of the political and electoral systems, and number
of elections), due to the few explicit constraints existing in their sample of countries.
Moving forward, in Table 1 we focus on the factors that inuence policy volatility,
giving special attention to our index of Delegation, which tries to capture the implicit
institutional arrangements faced by policy-makers when preparing, approving and imple-
menting the budget. In column (1), in a bivariate regression, a one-standard deviation
increase in the Delegation index14 would decrease policy volatility by about 12.5 per
cent.15 This is the expected eect, as the quality of institutions, i.e. more checks and
balances faced by politicians, prevent them from using scal policy for reasons not related
to the current situation of the economy.
In column (2), we assess the role played by the political variables. Our results im-
ply that countries with proportional systems have more volatility of discretionary scal
policy compared to majoritarian systems. The concentration of parliamentary seats in
a few parties (the Herndahl index) would also induce an increase in policy volatility.
Regarding the variable elections, an extensive strand of literature has tested whether
governments nearing an election choose to loosen scal discipline, engaging in excessive
spending or/and cuts in taxes to ensure future re-election, therefore creating more pol-
icy volatility. For instance, Annett (2006), Hallerberg et al. (2007), and Afonso and
Hauptmeier (2009) claim that there is evidence of a political budget cycle played by the
existence of elections in a given year, that is, elections negatively impinge on the improve-
ment of the scal position. In contrast with the previous views, we nd a negative sign of
elections on policy volatility, which corroborates the ndings of Fat as and Mihov (2003)
that elections hold politicians accountable. Nonetheless, this result should be interpreted
with due care as it is not statistically dierent from zero at conventional levels.
In column (3), we add two institutional variables that try to capture political in-
stability whether in the form of the number of cabinet changes or by the existence of
government crises. These variables are key determinants to show that higher political in-
14This is the usual interpretation of the coecient since the Delegation index was normalised to have
zero mean and standard deviation equal to one.
15The coecients' quantitative impact on policy volatility is more accurate if we take the exponential
of each coecient. In this case, the semi-elasticity of policy volatility with respect to the Delegation
index is 12.5 per cent (exp (-0.133)-1).
20stability leads to higher public decit volatility (Agnello and Sousa (2009)) and to higher
ination levels and volatility (Aisen and Veiga (2006, 2008)). Yet, in our regressions they
turn out to be statistically insignicant.
Including the macroeconomic and other control variables (column (4)) strongly in-
creases the t of regression (R-squared of 0.375) suggesting that these variables account
for a large portion of the variability in policy volatility, while the Delegation index is still
highly robust to these dierent specications. We expect to observe a negative coecient
of GDP per capita, since according to Fat as and Mihov (2003), it is likely that poorer
countries have a more volatile business cycle due to less developed nancial markets,
and at the same time, may resort more often to discretionary scal policy. Although
we nd a positive coecient of GDP per capita, we will see that it loses its statistical
signicance in the next column. As regards government size, policy volatility drops as the
ratio of primary expenditure increases. This conrms the results of Afonso et al. (2010),
who demonstrate that bigger governments have more stable government spending and
automatic stabilisers are larger, inducing lower volatility of discretionary spending.
Another variable that has been popular in explaining the volatility of scal policy is
country size (population of a given country). Smaller countries tend to use more discretion
in scal policy, as documented by Furceri and Poplawski (2008). They argue that the
negative relationship between the size of nations and government spending volatility
can be explained by two reasons: rst, smaller countries, which are more exposed to
idiosyncratic shocks and have more output volatility, use scal policy more aggressively;
second, larger countries have more scope to spread the government spending nancing
over a larger pool of taxpayers (increasing returns to scale), allowing governments to
provide public goods in a less volatile way.
The ndings on country size are corroborated by our results (Agnello and Sousa
(2009), and Afonso et al. (2010) have also found a negative eect of country size on
the volatilities of public decit and of spending and revenue, respectively). Another
demographic variable, the dependency ratio, is associated with higher levels of volatility,
whereas the run-up to the EMU dummy shows that the EU-12 countries, which initially
adhered to EMU requirements, experienced less policy volatility.
21Adding all the variables together does not really improve the quality of the regression
(R-squared of 0.421, from 0.375 of the previous specication), suggesting that the political
and institutional variables may not be so important to explain dierent levels of policy
volatility between countries (column (5)). Indeed, with the exception of the Herndahl
index, which points to an increase in policy volatility of nearly 18.7 per cent for each
additional tenth of a point index, none of these variables are signicant. In particular, our
results do not provide evidence for higher values of scal policy volatility in the presence
of a greater number of elections.16 Interestingly, the Delegation index is still highly
important: a one standard-deviation increase in this index would lower discretionary
policy volatility by approximately 18.2 per cent. Looking at the control variables, with
the exception of GDP per capita, all the variables that were signicant in column (4)
continue to be of crucial importance. For instance, a one-percentage point increase in
government size would lower policy volatility by 2.8 per cent, while a country (such as
Poland) that has twice the population of another country (like Romania) would have 13
per cent less policy volatility, all else being equal.
When estimating this type of equation, one econometric problem that may arise and
that could compromise our results and interpretations of the coecients, is the possibility
that budget outcomes (volatility of discretionary scal policy in our case) inuence the
evolution of scal institutions, rather than the other way around. We are assuming
that the causality runs from scal institutions (the Delegation index) to scal behaviour,
even though it is possible that these institutions might be simply a reection of a deep
preference of the society for scal discipline and stability. The literature has recognised
this problem of reverse causality as one of the most complex to solve, as it is extremely
dicult to nd instruments that are not inuenced by scal policy and can, at the same
time, inuence the scal institutions. What has been assumed in previous papers, is that
16This \puzzle" of the insignicance of elections on policy outcomes, which is in contrast with some of
the literature on electoral budget cycles, may be related to the fact that we are using periods of 10-year
averages. In order to test if the \election puzzle" is a consequence of this method, we have built a proxy
for policy volatility in annual terms by taking the squared residuals of the government spending equation
(Equation 1) for each year and country over the 1980-2007 period - this way of calculating government
spending volatility is not new, see Ramey and Ramey (1995). Afterwards we have employed the squared
residuals as the dependent variable in Equation (7). The results solve the puzzle, given that in election
years the squared residuals (the annual volatility) tend to be statistically signicantly higher, thereby
giving evidence for the existence of an electoral budget cycle played by the elections.
22Table 1: Delegation index and discretionary scal policy
Dependent variable: volatility of discretionary scal policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV
Delegation index -0.133** -0.036*** -0.154** -0.202*** -0.201*** -0.401*
(0.054) (0.010) (0.070) (0.047) (0.059) (0.236)
Electoral system 0.665*** 0.163 -0.222
(0.172) (0.243) (0.524)
Elections -0.793 0.218 -0.914
(0.953) (1.483) (1.381)
Herndahl index 2.045** 1.711* 0.996
(0.983) (1.034) (1.407)
Elec. competitiveness 0.030 0.050 0.054
(0.052) (0.046) (0.074)
Government crises -0.151 -0.188 -0.092
(0.285) (0.332) (0.295)
Cabinet changes -0.203 -0.022 -0.042
(0.369) (0.481) (0.490)
GDP per capita 0.375* 0.416 -0.022
(0.202) (0.317) (0.560)
Government size -0.034*** -0.028*** -0.031
(0.006) (0.008) (0.019)
Country size -0.138*** -0.129*** -0.198**
(0.042) (0.028) (0.078)
Dependency ratio 0.026*** 0.021* 0.010
(0.004) (0.012) (0.039)
Openness -0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Ination 0.004 0.008 0.005
(0.022) (0.025) (0.013)
Run-up to EMU -0.367*** -0.375*** -1.229**
(0.093) (0.140) (0.506)
SGP dummy -0.127 -0.181 -0.287
(0.082) (0.156) (0.270)
New members -0.209 -0.203 -0.873
(0.135) (0.143) (0.596)
Number of observations 57 57 57 57 57 42
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-squared 0.064 0.178 0.083 0.375 0.421 0.412
OID test (p-value) 0.206
Notes: OLS estimates with panel-corrected standard errors taking 10-year averages. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively, statistical signi-
cance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Constant terms are not reported. Policy volatility was obtained
from the logarithm of the standard deviation of residuals of Equation (1), with the growth of
real primary expenditure as dependent variable. In column 6, the Delegation index was instru-
mented by: delegation dummy and ve Worldwide Governance Indicators (see Appendix B).
The overidentifying restrictions test (OID) or Sargan test reports p-value from a test that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals.
scal policy cannot feed back into modication of scal institutions since they are costly
to change and it takes a long time to make any sort of considerable alteration.
23We try to deal with reverse causality, by resorting to a set of instruments for the
Delegation index: a dummy for countries with delegation in the execution of the budget;
and ve Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), namely voice and accountability, po-
litical stability and absence of violence, government eectiveness, regulatory quality, and
control of corruption.17 We argue that all these variables are not aected by scal pol-
icy, and have some predictive power in explaining the evolution of the Delegation index.
Nevertheless, all the IV estimates that we provide should be interpreted with extreme
prudence, as one can argue that our instruments may also suer from the same problems
they propose to solve.
In column (6) we have performed the estimation via 2SLS, i.e. using the IV estimator,
where we employ the above mentioned instruments for the Delegation index. The presence
of a measurement error in the dependent variable (as it is estimated rather than observed)
leads to attenuation bias in the previous columns (OLS estimations), i.e. the coecients
of the IV estimation more than double.18 Our index for the quality of institutions is still
highly signicant at better than the 10 per cent level of signicance: the point estimates
signal a negative impact on the dependent variable of approximately 33 per cent, ceteris
paribus. Notwithstanding the test of overidentifying restrictions (OID) conrms the
validity and appropriateness of our instruments, as it does not reject the orthogonality of
the instruments and the error terms (the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals),
we have to be prudent when interpreting these IV estimations since this test has low power
when the sample size is small. The results could therefore be misleading and we should
put more weight in the interpretation of the non-IV estimations.
4.2 Fiscal rule index
The overall results of Table 1 gave support to the idea that scal institutions in the form
of tight budgetary procedures matter for the volatility of scal policy. For numerical
17See the variable denitions in Appendix B.
18Wooldridge (2002, pp. 89) states that OLS regressions may suer from attenuation bias due to
classical errors-in-variables assumption (measurement errors), which would produce lower coecients
compared to IV regressions. He also oers another type of explanation which points to the possibility
that the instruments are not entirely exogenous.
24scal rules, a negative sign is also expected. Our prediction is conrmed in Table 2:19 in
a bivariate regression (column (1)), a one-standard deviation increase in the FRI would
cause a decrease in public spending volatility by approximately 13.6 per cent.
Going forward, in column (5), the FRI is still highly signicant when we consider the
political, institutional and macroeconomic controls. On average, it would reduce policy
volatility by around 17.0 per cent for an additional standard deviation in the FRI. The
estimate obtained for the GDP per capita coecient, contrasting to the one obtained
in Table 1, has the expected sign at the 10 per cent level of signicance, signalling that
richer countries are associated with lower levels of volatility. In turn, bigger governments
and countries continue to be associated with reduced levels of policy volatility.
Considering the exposure of economic sectors to external competitiveness, we expect
economies more open to external trade, and therefore more exposed to external shocks, to
exert an upward force on policy volatility, as documented by Agnello and Sousa (2009).
In fact, this is what is shown by our estimates, although with a small quantitative impact:
a one-percentage point increase in the degree of openness would lead to an increase of
public spending volatility by about 0.3 per cent.
Regarding the last three dummy variables, estimates suggest that all of them are
associated with lower levels of policy volatility. The interpretation over the sign of the run-
up to EMU and the SGP dummy is consensual as those stages have required signicant
improvements in public nances, lowering therefore policy volatility. In contrast, the
explanation for the new members (CEEC) dummy lies on the fact that data for most
of the new members are only available for the last decade (Figure 1), conditioning the
analysis to only one observation per country. This period of time was indeed marked by
major improvements in public nances in order to meet requirements for joining the EU,
which led the CEEC to post low values of discretion.
Similarly to the previous table, we account for the possibility of reverse causality
running from policy volatility to scal rules. The instruments are the same as the ones
used before for the Delegation index, except for the Delegation dummy, which is replaced
19In all tables where we use the FRI, we lose some observations due to the shorter period covered. In
addition, comparing to Table 1, Malta is included and Romania is dropped due to lack of data.
25Table 2: Fiscal rule index and discretionary scal policy
Dependent variable: volatility of discretionary scal policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV
Fiscal rule index -0.146*** -0.088*** -0.166*** -0.212*** -0.186*** -0.358*
(0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.040) (0.210)
Electoral system 0.540*** 0.466 0.441
(0.149) (0.379) (0.341)
Elections -1.422 -1.420 -1.214
(0.997) (1.144) (1.436)
Herndahl index 0.869 0.420 -0.760
(0.685) (0.297) (1.756)
Elec. competitiveness -0.002 0.016 -0.024
(0.038) (0.034) (0.092)
Government crises -0.119 -0.160 -0.271
(0.213) (0.358) (0.322)
Cabinet changes -0.403 -0.014 0.029
(0.329) (0.623) (0.488)
GDP per capita -0.454*** -0.409* -0.103
(0.171) (0.244) (0.539)
Government size -0.022*** -0.020** -0.028*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.016)
Country size -0.137*** -0.079* -0.029
(0.025) (0.044) (0.097)
Dependency ratio -0.040* -0.025 -0.022
(0.021) (0.027) (0.034)
Openness 0.003** 0.003** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Ination -0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.024) (0.021) (0.013)
Run-up to EMU -1.738*** -1.724*** -1.987***
(0.095) (0.041) (0.607)
SGP dummy -0.550*** -0.598*** -0.750**
(0.139) (0.130) (0.323)
New members -1.528*** -1.431*** -1.374***
(0.079) (0.121) (0.518)
Number of observations 42 42 42 42 42 42
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-squared 0.066 0.158 0.101 0.388 0.430 0.397
OID test (p-value) 0.319
Notes: OLS estimates with panel-corrected standard errors taking 10-year averages. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively, statistical signicance
at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Constant terms are not reported. Policy volatility was obtained from
the logarithm of the standard deviation of residuals of Equation (1), with the growth of real pri-
mary expenditure as dependent variable. In column 6, the Fiscal rule index was instrumented by:
commitment dummy and ve Worldwide Governance Indicators (see Appendix B). The overiden-
tifying restrictions test (OID) or Sargan test reports p-value from a test that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the residuals.
by a dummy that assumes the value of 1 for countries that rule their budget process
mainly by commitment over scal contracts. This replacement is justied by the fact
26that countries that privilege delegation have more implicit budgetary procedures, whilst
countries characterized by commitment to scal contracts have more numerical scal rules
shaping the budget process. The IV estimation shows that the FRI is still signicant,
albeit with lower statistical power.
4.3 Bringing together the implicit and explicit constraints
After analysing the importance of implicit and explicit restrictions, it might be of interest
to check if these results remain valid even after considering both types of restrictions in
the same equation. But, before turning to the estimates, one may argue that when
running regressions with variables that capture the implicit and explicit restrictions on
the budget process, collinearity problems might emerge as they can be expected to be
highly correlated. The working assumption that we will follow, however, is that these
two variables capture dierent types of restrictions in force in a given country, not being
necessarily correlated. This is in the spirit of Hallerberg et al. (2007), who have also
employed indexes of delegation and rules in the same equation. They state that the
nature of restrictions depends on the type of government (one-party governments versus
coalitions with high ideological dispersion), so it is not necessarily true that a higher
Delegation index implies a higher Rule index.
Looking at Table 3, we corroborate the previous ndings concerning the indexes for the
quality of institutions, which point towards a sizeable negative impact on policy volatil-
ity. Throughout all specications, the marginal impact of the FRI on public spending
volatility ranges between -6.9 and -14.1 per cent, whereas the range on the Delegation
index runs between -4.5 and -17.7 per cent. Taking the last column with all the control
variables, there is a strong indication that countries which stand at a one-standard devia-
tion above the average in both indexes have on average -27.4 per cent less volatility in the
discretionary component of scal policy. It is a striking result that reinforces our previous
estimates: better and more stringent restrictions imposed on the conduct of scal policy
help mitigate the negative impact of policy volatility on the economy. For instance, if
Portugal improved the quality of its institutions, by increasing both indexes (FRI and
27Table 3: Delegation and Fiscal rule indexes and discretionary scal policy
Dependent variable: volatility of discretionary scal policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fiscal rule index -0.105*** -0.072*** -0.134*** -0.152*** -0.119***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016)
Delegation index -0.093* -0.046* -0.084 -0.195*** -0.177***
(0.051) (0.026) (0.068) (0.025) (0.062)




Herndahl index 1.077 0.739***
(0.679) (0.168)
Elec. competitiveness -0.002 0.034
(0.033) (0.038)
Government crises -0.155 -0.142
(0.248) (0.408)
Cabinet changes -0.354 -0.039
(0.412) (0.639)
GDP per capita -0.064 -0.220
(0.256) (0.396)
Government size -0.032*** -0.025***
(0.009) (0.009)
Country size -0.138*** -0.131***
(0.035) (0.038)






Run-up to EMU -1.507*** -1.538***
(0.113) (0.059)
SGP dummy -0.470*** -0.477***
(0.131) (0.109)
New members -1.083*** -1.170***
(0.154) (0.096)
Number of observations 41 41 41 41 41
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.084 0.165 0.113 0.439 0.462
Notes: OLS estimates with panel-corrected standard errors taking 10-year averages.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively,
statistical signicance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Constant terms are not reported.
Policy volatility was obtained from the logarithm of the standard deviation of residuals
of Equation (1), with the growth of real primary expenditure as dependent variable.
Delegation index) by one-standard deviation above the average levels, and considering
that the average value for the last decade reects its current policy volatility, it would
reduce policy volatility from 2.5 to 1.8 (reaching values close to Romania and below those
28of Spain).
In terms of political controls, we only nd statistical evidence for the Herndahl index.
Higher concentration of parliamentary seats in a few political parties appears, thus, to
undermine scal discipline: for each additional tenth of a point index, the dependent
variable would rise by 7.7 per cent. Furthermore, government size and country size are
still robust to dierent specications, and with the expected sign. Finally, the last three
dummies continue to be signicant controls for our estimations.
4.4 Sub-categories of the FRI and Delegation index
Another pertinent analysis would be to conrm if the results remain valid and robust
when we proceed to disaggregate the indexes for the quality of institutions into sub-
categories. Furthermore, it would be of interest to nd which sub-component, feeding
each index, exerts the most inuential role in reducing policy volatility.
The indexes that we have focused on so far here can be subdivided into the following
sub-indexes: the Delegation index is subdivided into the Preparation, Implementation
and Approval stages; the FRI is split into two indexes that capture all the expenditure
rules in force in the EU member states, the expenditure rule index (ERI), and into another
that deals with budget balance and debt rules (BBDRI).
We begin with Table 4, which displays the specications of each phase of the Dele-
gation index. The most interesting nding relates to the fact that, among all the stages
through which the budget draft is prepared, approved and implemented, only the Ap-
proval index seems to have explanatory power for policy volatility in the case where we
include all the relevant control variables. Taking column (5), its individual eect on
the volatility of scal policy points to a negative impact of around 15.1 per cent for an
additional one-standard deviation increase in the Approval index.20
20Nonetheless, this does not mean that the preparation and implementation stages should be left out
from the design of an optimal institutional framework for scal policy. In fact, the three variables could
be highly correlated between them, and the Approval index may be capturing the eects of the other
two indexes on policy volatility, which ultimately would produce misleading results. We have tested if
there is any statistical signicant correlation between each one of these three variables, and the results,
however, only pointed to a signicant correlation between the Preparation index and Approval index of
about 0.6.
29Table 4: Sub-categories of Delegation index and discretionary scal policy
Dependent variable: volatility of discretionary scal policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Preparation index -0.134* -0.114 -0.134* -0.099* -0.111
(0.077) (0.07) (0.076) (0.059) (0.083)
Approval index -0.125*** -0.065 -0.140*** -0.154** -0.164**
(0.046) (0.060) (0.043) (0.068) (0.077)
Implementation index 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.098*** -0.021 -0.032
(0.021) (0.024) (0.030) (0.043) (0.077)




Herndahl index 1.604** 1.457*
(0.794) (0.788)
Elec. competitiveness 0.018 0.033
(0.041) (0.057)
Government crises -0.122 -0.241
(0.166) (0.261)
Cabinet changes -0.208 0.056
(0.308) (0.424)
GDP per capita 0.372** 0.449
(0.189) (0.326)
Government size -0.030*** -0.026***
(0.006) (0.007)
Country size -0.093 -0.090
(0.076) (0.066)






Run-up to EMU -0.388*** -0.400***
(0.103) (0.139)
SGP dummy -0.109 -0.174
(0.072) (0.141)
New members -0.220* -0.238
(0.131) (0.154)
Number of observations 57 57 57 57 57
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24
R-squared 0.204 0.258 0.221 0.397 0.439
Notes: OLS estimates with panel-corrected standard errors taking 10-year averages.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively,
statistical signicance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Constant terms are not reported.
Policy volatility was obtained from the logarithm of the standard deviation of residuals
of Equation (1), with the growth of real primary expenditure as dependent variable.
Against this background, policy-makers should arguably aim for a strong Approval
index. That is, rstly, the executive should be vested with strong agenda-setting powers
30in order to be protected against signicant parliamentary amendments to the initial
proposal of the budget, which can create excessive volatility in the conduct of scal policy;
secondly, the possibility that parliament is dissolved if it fails to approve the budget in
due time would increase the political costs associated to such a fall of government, which
would lead to a more consensus on the initial budget proposal; and nally, the sequence
of votes also matters to reduce policy volatility, i.e. the order of decision-making during
the parliamentary budget deliberation should be focused rst on dening the limits over
total revenue, expenditure and decit before the work on the details of the budget starts.
Regarding other variables, column (5) provides further evidence for a negative rela-
tionship between government size and policy volatility, whereas there is also some support
for a destabilising eect on policy volatility of higher concentration of power in the parties.
Moving forward to the sub-categories of the FRI, our overall assessment of columns
(1) to (5) of Table 5 is that considering the index of numerical scal rules as a whole or
taking each sub-component individually leads to qualitatively equal results. Column (5)
tells us that a one-standard deviation increase in the ERI and in the BBDRI, other things
being equal, would reduce policy volatility by about 11.6 and 14.4 per cent, respectively.
From an ecient point of view, estimates suggest that it would be preferable to focus
more on budget balance and debt rules, since they appear to have more impact on scal
policy volatility than expenditure rules. Nevertheless, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coecients are statistically equal to each other (at better than the 18 per cent
level).
As regards other variables, there is strong evidence that bigger governments and
countries have lower levels of policy volatility, and there is also some evidence that richer
countries experience less police volatility, although with low statistical power. Again, the
last three dummies continue to be highly signicant.
In the last two columns, we employ for the two indexes individually, the same in-
struments used before for the FRI and we estimate the equation via 2SLS. Although the
results suggest no statistical eect of the ERI and the BBDRI on the dependent variable,
we should interpret these IV estimations with some caution, given that they reect essen-
tially an attempt to resolve the reverse causality problem running from policy volatility
31to rules.
Finally, Table 6 focuses the analysis on all the previous ve sub-indexes to check if
the prior results remain valid. Adding up those indexes does not aect the overall results
of previous tables. In fact, we nd that the coecients and the statistical signicance
of the ERI and the BBDRI, and of the Approval index, are broadly unchanged. The
BBDRI is persistently associated with lower levels of policy volatility, while the ERI
becomes signicant when we include the macroeconomic variables. In turn, the Approval
index is also highly statistically signicant to help attain low levels of policy volatility,
but with the advantage of being robust throughout all the specications. Furthermore,
government size loses signicance in the last column, at the expense of GDP per capita.
The last three dummies also contribute to lower policy volatility.
32Table 5: Sub-categories of Fiscal rule index and discretionary scal policy
Dependent variable: volatility of discretionary scal policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IV IV
Expenditure rule -0.065* -0.047* -0.104** -0.097** -0.123*** -0.353
index (0.036) (0.025) (0.043) (0.039) (0.011) (0.224)
B.B. and debt -0.118*** -0.075*** -0.122*** -0.165*** -0.155*** -0.228
rules index (0.020) (0.015) (0.031) (0.033) (0.020) (0.206)
Electoral system 0.540*** 0.526 0.716* 0.427
(0.148) (0.350) (0.401) (0.346)
Elections -1.489 -1.661 -2.041 -1.466
(0.998) (1.073) (1.584) (1.429)
Herndahl index 0.832 0.216 0.686 0.036
(0.740) (0.533) (1.289) (1.805)
Elec. competit. -0.006 0.011 0.092 -0.028
(0.037) (0.039) (0.089) (0.110)
Government crises -0.121 -0.187 -0.234 -0.156
(0.212) (0.338) (0.346) (0.312)
Cabinet changes -0.464 -0.065 -0.159 -0.016
(0.421) (0.637) (0.540) (0.489)
GDP per capita -0.462** -0.355* -0.260 -0.420
(0.221) (0.206) (0.527) (0.486)
Government size -0.022*** -0.020** -0.004 -0.028
(0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.019)
Country size -0.140*** -0.063** -0.035 -0.081
(0.032) (0.030) (0.104) (0.089)
Dependency ratio -0.038** -0.022 -0.034 -0.015
(0.016) (0.025) (0.038) (0.036)
Openness 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Ination -0.005 0.003 0.015 -0.003
(0.024) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013)
Run-up to EMU -1.724*** -1.768*** -1.833*** -1.721***
(0.076) (0.034) (0.622) (0.576)
SGP dummy -0.540*** -0.618*** -0.630** -0.604**
(0.128) (0.108) (0.318) (0.307)
New members -1.502*** -1.400*** -1.596*** -1.304**
(0.100) (0.067) (0.571) (0.543)
No. Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
No. Countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-squared 0.063 0.161 0.104 0.381 0.437 0.263 0.391
OID test (p-value) 0.453 0.187
Notes: OLS estimates with panel-corrected standard errors taking 10-year averages. Standard errors
are shown in parentheses. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively, statistical signicance at the 10,
5 and 1% level. Constant terms are not reported. Policy volatility was obtained from the logarithm
of the standard deviation of residuals of Equation (1), with the growth of real primary expenditure as
dependent variable. In columns 6 and 7, the ERI and BBDRI were instrumented by the same variables
used in Table 2. The overidentifying restrictions test (OID) or Sargan test reports p-value from a test
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals.
33Table 6: Sub-indexes and discretionary scal policy
Dependent variable: volatility of discretionary scal policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expenditure rule index -0.011 0.013 -0.053 -0.088** -0.097***
(0.036) (0.048) (0.060) (0.043) (0.036)
B.B. and debt rules index -0.081*** -0.058 -0.099*** -0.139*** -0.133**
(0.025) (0.065) (0.030) (0.043) (0.058)
Preparation index -0.104 -0.092 -0.092 -0.162 -0.170
(0.120) (0.169) (0.114) (0.113) (0.161)
Approval index -0.128*** -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.144*** -0.152***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.051) (0.024)
Implementation index 0.083** 0.076*** 0.089* 0.078 0.090
(0.039) (0.028) (0.047) (0.059) (0.071)




Herndahl index 1.141* 0.301
(0.664) (0.348)
Elec. competitiveness -0.007 0.021
(0.023) (0.053)
Government crises -0.166 -0.297
(0.158) (0.269)
Cabinet changes -0.414 0.094
(0.447) (0.677)
GDP per capita -0.222 -0.302***
(0.162) (0.064)
Government size -0.023*** -0.018
(0.009) (0.013)
Country size -0.051 -0.027
(0.058) (0.045)






Run-up to EMU -1.911*** -2.030***
(0.292) (0.446)
SGP dummy -0.559*** -0.616***
(0.165) (0.213)
New members -1.430*** -1.595***
(0.278) (0.559)
Number of observations 41 41 41 41 41
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.168 0.229 0.203 0.490 0.521
Notes: OLS estimates with panel-corrected standard errors taking 10-year averages.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively,
statistical signicance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Constant terms are not reported.
Policy volatility was obtained from the logarithm of the standard deviation of residuals
of Equation (1), with the growth of real primary expenditure as dependent variable.
345 Robustness results
In this section, we conduct some robustness analysis to check if the remarks inferred
from our baseline estimates could be extended in two ways, whether by using a dierent
measure of public spending in Equation (1) or by using another specication for the scal
reaction function to derive our measure of discretionary scal policy volatility.
Firstly, we replace real primary expenditure by real consumption expenditure in Equa-
tion (1) as the proxy for public spending. We want to test if a narrower measure of scal
policy, which has been widely used by most of the papers when using a large sample
of countries, does still corroborate our ndings. Afterwards, we re-estimate dierent
specications of columns (5) of previous tables (from Table 1 to Table 6).
Overall, the results seem a little disappointing as the indexes for the quality of institu-
tions suggest that they have no statistical eect on policy volatility (Table 8 of Appendix
A). This can be associated with the fact that we are dealing with a less comprehensive
measure of scal policy, leaving out important items of government expenditure, such as
gross capital formation, subsidies and social benets other than transfers in kind, other
current transfers and capital transfers, which might not be capturing all discretionary
measures undertaken by governments. With respect to the other variables, government
size continues to be highly signicant and with the expected sign, whereas there is some
support for lower policy volatility in bigger countries. In contrast, policy volatility is
higher in the presence of a greater number of elections and of high ination.
We now turn to Equation (2), where we estimate a typical reaction function for the
CAPE, which reacts to the output gap, past developments in public debt and to its own
past values. Similarly to what was done before, we take the logarithm of the standard
deviation of the residuals as our measure of the volatility of discretionary scal policy.
Contrary to what was shown before (Table 1), Table 9 displays no signicant impact
of the Delegation index on policy volatility, once we include all the relevant control
variables.21 In contrast, column (2) and (3) exhibit strong negative eects of the FRI on
policy volatility, giving robustness to our previous ndings. The last two columns in the
21Still, it is very close to the relevant thresholds of signicance (signicant at the 12 per cent level).
35sub-categories of the FRI also support the relevant role played by the ERI and the BBDRI
in reducing policy volatility. In column (6), all the coecients of the sub-components
of the Delegation index become very powerful in explaining dierences in scal policy
volatility, though with some odd results. In fact, this estimate yields unexplained results,
where only the Preparation stage has the expected (negative) sign.
A result that deserves further analysis relates to the coecients of government size.
So far, we have seen that big governments have been associated with less policy volatility
since they seek to fundamentally smooth the adverse eects of shocks. Yet, the size
of government loses its signicance when we use the specication of Table 9 (except in
column (6), but with the wrong sign). A possible explanation is that, in this estimation,
the residuals were obtained from an equation where primary spending was cyclically
adjusted, that is, by construction, the reaction to shocks through automatic stabilisers
was removed. In this context, bigger governments no longer mean less policy volatility.
As a nal point, Table 10 summarises the results for the case where we use the ratio
of consumption expenditure to potential GDP, instead of the CAPE, as the proxy for
public spending in Equation (2). In general, this table conrms some of the results of
the previous table. For instance, there is no explanatory power of the Delegation index,
while the FRI continues to have statistical power to reduce policy volatility. Regarding
the sub-indexes of both main indexes, we nd some dierences with the previous table,
where the ERI and all the sub-components of the Delegation index are never signicant.
As we have shown, the results we get depend, to a large extent, on the measure used
for public spending. Spearman's rank order correlations for the four dierent dependent
variables that we have used (Table 7), corroborate our previous ndings: it is not irrel-
evant which variable is used to compute the volatility of discretionary scal policy, i.e.
we can obtain dierent empirical results as the ranks obtained dier considerably. For
instance, for the 1990 decade, even though there is positive correlation between all vari-
ables, there is no statistical evidence (at the 1 per cent level) that permits us to conrm
that we will obtain similar results regardless of the measure that is used.
36Table 7: Spearman rank order correlations by decade
1980 Discretion 1 Discretion 2 Discretion 3 Discretion 4
Discretion 1 1.000
Discretion 2 0.804* 1.000
Discretion 3 0.621 0.425 1.000
Discretion 4 0.614 0.671* 0.579 1.000
1990
Discretion 1 1.000
Discretion 2 0.382 1.000
Discretion 3 0.625 0.421 1.000
Discretion 4 0.589 0.621 0.536 1.000
2000
Discretion 1 1.000
Discretion 2 0.337 1.000
Discretion 3 0.824* 0.484 1.000
Discretion 4 0.401 0.639 0.400 1.000
Note: * indicates statistical signicance at the 1% level. Discretion 1 and 2
refer to equation (1) where we used primary and consumption expenditure
as dependent variable, respectively. Discretion 3 and 4, refer to equation
(2) where we used the ratios of CAPE and consumption to potential output,
respectively.
6 Concluding Remarks
This work provides evidence for a sizeable, statistically signicant negative impact of the
quality of institutions on public spending volatility in the EU countries. It is probably the
case that countries with more checks and balances make it more dicult for governments
to change scal policy for reasons unrelated to the current state of the economy.
Taking our baseline specication for public spending (primary expenditure), we show
that numerical scal rules in force in EU countries are statistically signicant to reduce
discretionary scal policy volatility. We also show that increased values of the Delegation
index, which captures the implicit procedures governing the budget process, can help
attain lower policy volatility. Of the three phases of the budget process, however, only
the Approval stage, in which the budget draft is reviewed, approved and then formalised,
appears to have statistical power to explain cross-country dierences in policy volatility.
In quantitative terms, including all the relevant control variables, countries that stand
a one-standard deviation above the average in both the FRI and Delegation index have
37on average -27.4 per cent less volatility in the discretionary component of scal policy.
This nding reinforces the need for a well-dened and appropriate institutional design of
scal rules and of budgetary procedures.
Our results conrm the ndings of Furceri and Poplawski (2008), who state that bigger
countries have on general less government spending volatility, as they resort less to gov-
ernment spending for ne-tuning purposes and as governments from big countries could
provide public goods in a less volatile way. Our estimates provide further evidence about
the stabilising function that bigger governments exert, since countries with large public
sectors as a percentage of GDP have more stable government spending and automatic
stabilisers are larger, inducing lower volatility of discretionary spending.
What appears to be a surprise, and in fact contrasts with results elsewhere, relates
to the insignicance of most of the political factors. In fact, with the exception of the
Herndahl index which suggests that high concentration of parliamentary seats in a few
parties would increase public spending volatility, none of the political variables turn out
to be statistically signicant. For instance, we do not nd an electoral budget cycle
played by the existence of elections, as documented by several authors. Nevertheless, this
"election puzzle" could be the result of the method employed, the 10-year averages, as it
tends to display relatively unchanged averages by decade across countries. This puzzle is
solved when we use a proxy for policy volatility in annual terms, giving evidence for an
electoral budget cycle. Alternatively, if one takes into account that we are dealing with
the EU countries that have more political similarities than one would initially suspect,
then the results in relation to the political variables are less surprising.
In general, the run-up to EMU and the SGP dummies have the expected sign, which
points to lower levels of policy volatility. For most of the new EU members, where we
have only one decade of data available, the results generally point to reduced levels of
policy volatility, reecting recent improvements towards sounder public nances in order
to meet the requirements for joining the EU.
Our analysis is nevertheless somewhat conditioned by the choice on the measure used
for public spending. For instance, if we chose public consumption instead of primary
expenditure (used in the baseline), none of the variables measuring the quality of insti-
38tutions would be signicant. This is an interesting result as it can shed some light on
the possible weaknesses of previous studies (Fat as and Mihov (2003), and Afonso et al.
(2010)), where public consumption has been used as the measure of public spending. In
fact, by relying on a less comprehensive measure of scal policy, these previous studies
have left out important items of government expenditure (such as gross capital forma-
tion, subsidies and social benets other than transfers in kind, other current transfers
and capital transfers), which cannot capture all discretionary measures undertaken by
governments and ultimately can lead to misleading results. Using a typical scal reaction
function with the CAPE or the ratio of consumption expenditure to GDP as proxies of
public spending would produce similar results as the baseline ones for the scal rules vari-
ables. Nonetheless, we would not be able to reject the hypothesis of the insignicance of
the implicit procedural rules governing the budget process on public spending volatility.
All in all, by studying the eects of explicit and implicit budgetary constraints on
scal policy volatility, we contribute to the debate on improving and reaching an optimal
institutional framework for scal policy. Although our results point to the strengthen-
ing of scal institutions, each case must be considered individually, taking into account
the prevailing institutional and economic environment, and evaluating the advantages
and disadvantages of the application of given constraints. In fact, there are some coun-
tries that are more exposed and vulnerable to external shocks and therefore it would be
preferable to have more exibility to respond to these shocks, minimising in that way the
economic costs of restrictions and deliberately letting the volatility increase.
The current analysis also oers several possibilities for further research. Applying the
same analysis of the current study, it would be interesting to explore other data sets with
respect to the proxy for the quality of institutions, for example concerning independent
scal institutions. After studying the impacts of restrictions on policy volatility, one
could also test, following Fat as and Mihov (2006), if the impacts of the imposition of
tight restrictions that reduce policy volatility, and thus output volatility as well, would
in fact outweigh the negative eects of the loss of exibility to respond to output shocks.
Another possible extension, in line with Fabrizio and Mody (2008), would be to identify
what determines the existing institutional environment in force in EU countries.
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A Tables: Robustness results
40Table 8: Consumption expenditure and discretionary scal policy
Dependent variable: volatility of discretionary scal policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fiscal rule index -0.194 -0.144
(0.291) (0.213)
Expenditure rules index 0.075 0.102
(0.185) (0.117)
B.B. and debt rules index -0.235 -0.214
(0.261) (0.135)
Delegation index -0.096 -0.096
(0.121) (0.213)
Preparation index -0.076 -0.041
(0.239) (0.237)
Approval index -0.094 -0.061
(0.114) (0.073)
Implementation index 0.009 0.005
(0.070) (0.124)
Electoral system -0.026 0.050 -0.102 -0.157 -0.031 -0.189
(0.254) (0.432) (0.313) (0.194) (0.55) (0.213)
Elections 3.115*** 5.471*** 5.416*** 3.522*** 5.370*** 5.342***
(0.740) (0.420) (0.428) (0.742) (0.437) (0.914)
Herndahl index 1.152* -0.923 -0.433 0.937 -1.017 -0.452
(0.638) (1.860) (1.927) (0.660) (2.198) (1.978)
Elec. competitiveness -0.001 -0.030 -0.017 -0.012 -0.081 -0.076
(0.048) (0.154) (0.134) (0.044) (0.167) (0.104)
Government crises 0.227 0.227* 0.272*** 0.186 0.238** 0.264***
(0.180) (0.130) (0.090) (0.216) (0.112) (0.045)
Cabinet changes 0.087 -0.522** -0.565* 0.139 -0.433** -0.451***
(0.221) (0.251) (0.290) (0.246) (0.174) (0.112)
GDP per capita -0.055 -0.250 -0.169 -0.027 -0.345 -0.317
(0.365) (1.210) (1.493) (0.356) (1.300) (1.276)
Government size -0.019* -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.017* -0.046*** -0.044**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.021)
Country size -0.237*** -0.164 -0.210** -0.209*** -0.185 -0.209*
(0.071) (0.129) (0.089) (0.079) (0.164) (0.109)
Dependency ratio 0.003 0.058 0.067 -0.002 0.065 0.065
(0.021) (0.052) (0.076) (0.015) (0.080) (0.084)
Openness -0.004 -0.007* -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008)
Ination 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.035***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Run-up to EMU 0.896*** 0.368 0.497 0.873*** 0.441* 0.476
(0.086) (0.227) (0.434) (0.146) (0.233) (0.348)
SGP dummy 0.392** 0.328 0.406*** 0.407*** 0.337 0.379***
(0.160) (0.238) (0.147) (0.109) (0.231) (0.136)
New members 0.453 0.319 0.475 0.432 0.420 0.485
(0.330) (1.018) (1.327) (0.335) (1.247) (1.286)
Number of observations 60 45 44 60 45 44
Number of countries 24 24 23 24 24 23
R-squared 0.667 0.719 0.721 0.671 0.738 0.740
Notes: OLS estimates with panel-corrected standard errors taking 10-year averages. Standard errors
are shown in parentheses. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively, statistical signicance at the 10,
5 and 1% level. Constant terms are not reported. Policy volatility was obtained from the logarithm of
the standard deviation of residuals of Equation (1), with the growth of real consumption expenditure
as dependent variable.
41Table 9: CAPE and discretionary scal policy
Dependent variable: volatility of discretionary scal policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fiscal rule index -0.174** -0.168***
(0.086) (0.054)
Expenditure rules index -0.094*** -0.110***
(0.035) (0.006)
B.B. and debt rules index -0.127 -0.071***
(0.087) (0.020)
Delegation index -0.078 0.071
(0.050) (0.076)
Preparation index -0.188 -0.333**
(0.118) (0.144)
Approval index -0.029 0.101***
(0.049) (0.027)
Implementation index 0.090 0.366***
(0.090) (0.062)
Electoral system 0.096 0.226 0.343 -0.087 0.274 0.105
(0.282) (0.307) (0.415) (0.272) (0.258) (0.386)
Elections 0.789 0.270 0.138 1.529 0.049 0.243
(1.751) (2.396) (2.046) (1.524) (2.301) (1.247)
Herndahl index 0.917 -0.700 -0.084 0.625 -0.703 0.296
(1.434) (0.495) (0.119) (1.035) (0.698) (0.208)
Elec. competitiveness -0.034 -0.049 -0.048 -0.044 -0.047 0.023
(0.046) (0.129) (0.120) (0.050) (0.141) (0.055)
Government crises -0.074 -0.214 -0.172 -0.130 -0.215 -0.264***
(0.362) (0.383) (0.358) (0.252) (0.351) (0.066)
Cabinet changes -0.006 -0.113 -0.189 0.102 -0.171 -0.221
(0.499) (0.417) (0.420) (0.395) (0.415) (0.350)
GDP per capita -0.134 -0.221 -0.389 -0.088 -0.217 -0.969***
(0.265) (0.601) (0.595) (0.232) (0.656) (0.245)
Government size 0.003 -0.000 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.034***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.022) (0.011) (0.023) (0.009)
Country size -0.100*** -0.027*** -0.041 -0.049 -0.021 0.064**
(0.022) (0.007) (0.026) (0.044) (0.023) (0.027)
Dependency ratio 0.032*** 0.009 0.004 0.016 0.012 -0.074***
(0.005) (0.020) (0.017) (0.010) (0.029) (0.022)
Openness 0.003 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004 0.002*** 0.009***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002)
Ination -0.002 0.027 0.027 -0.005 0.031 0.056***
(0.016) (0.031) (0.052) (0.013) (0.031) (0.008)
Run-up to EMU -0.206*** -0.948*** -0.953*** -0.285*** -0.935** -1.878***
(0.056) (0.349) (0.351) (0.062) (0.411) (0.253)
SGP dummy 0.213 -0.043 -0.046 0.242** -0.030 -0.108
(0.151) (0.096) (0.078) (0.114) (0.096) (0.159)
New members 0.211* -0.265 -0.338 0.145 -0.234 -1.358***
(0.121) (0.400) (0.408) (0.123) (0.502) (0.222)
Number of observations 54 39 38 54 39 38
Number of countries 24 24 23 24 24 23
R-squared 0.364 0.332 0.342 0.446 0.326 0.614
Notes: OLS estimates with panel-corrected standard errors taking 10-year averages. Standard errors
are shown in parentheses. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively, statistical signicance at the 10,
5 and 1% level. Constant terms are not reported. Policy volatility was obtained from the logarithm
of the standard deviation of residuals of Equation (2), with the ratio of CAPE to potential GDP as
dependent variable.
42Table 10: Ratio of consumption expenditure and discretionary scal policy
Dependent variable: volatility of discretionary scal policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fiscal rule index -0.191** -0.129**
(0.076) (0.062)
Expenditure rules index -0.060 -0.006
(0.069) (0.070)
B.B. and debt rules index -0.203** -0.194**
(0.101) (0.080)
Delegation index 0.041 0.026
(0.026) (0.020)
Preparation index 0.023 0.059
(0.058) (0.052)
Approval index 0.056 0.002
(0.036) (0.043)
Implementation index -0.026* 0.005
(0.015) (0.007)
Electoral system 0.248 0.111 0.212 0.311 0.136 0.253
(0.233) (0.326) (0.297) (0.236) (0.327) (0.348)
Elections 0.118 0.834 0.223 -0.134 0.600 0.029
(0.355) (1.314) (1.478) (0.419) (1.267) (1.178)
Herndahl index 1.719*** -1.687*** 0.806 1.865*** -1.987** 0.432
(0.181) (0.630) (0.889) (0.125) (0.977) (1.320)
Elec. competitiveness 0.007 -0.046 -0.033 0.020 -0.075 -0.086
(0.098) (0.123) (0.100) (0.091) (0.145) (0.115)
Government crises -0.014 -0.128 -0.002 0.015 -0.145 -0.024
(0.032) (0.236) (0.193) (0.054) (0.248) (0.254)
Cabinet changes 0.205 0.049 -0.072 0.160 0.058 -0.009
(0.249) (0.234) (0.429) (0.227) (0.160) (0.360)
GDP per capita -0.207 0.079 -0.254 -0.220* 0.111 -0.189
(0.128) (0.327) (0.376) (0.126) (0.450) (0.535)
Government size 0.013*** -0.005 0.009 0.012** -0.010* -0.000
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Country size -0.183*** -0.088*** -0.192*** -0.207*** -0.078** -0.187**
(0.011) (0.022) (0.054) (0.017) (0.031) (0.078)
Dependency ratio -0.009 0.004 -0.001 -0.006 0.009 0.009
(0.016) (0.019) (0.026) (0.018) (0.007) (0.021)
Openness 0.003* -0.002 0.000 0.002* -0.003* -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Ination 0.050** 0.085 0.044 0.049** 0.074 0.023
(0.024) (0.059) (0.041) (0.021) (0.053) (0.031)
Run-up to EMU 0.787*** 0.188 0.268* 0.789*** 0.152 0.275*
(0.178) (0.182) (0.159) (0.154) (0.197) (0.146)
SGP dummy 0.222 0.064 0.095 0.219 0.026 0.022
(0.162) (0.202) (0.228) (0.168) (0.207) (0.242)
New members 0.006 -0.196 -0.189 0.034 -0.124 -0.053
(0.137) (0.131) (0.282) (0.133) (0.103) (0.286)
Number of observations 54 39 38 54 39 38
Number of countries 24 24 23 24 24 23
R-squared 0.495 0.44 0.531 0.502 0.460 0.571
Notes: OLS estimates with panel-corrected standard errors taking 10-year averages. Standard errors
are shown in parentheses. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively, statistical signicance at the 10,
5 and 1% level. Constant terms are not reported. Policy volatility was obtained from the logarithm
of the standard deviation of residuals of Equation (2), with the ratio of consumption expenditure to
potential GDP as dependent variable.
43B Variable denitions
Country-specic regressions - Equations (1) and (2)
Data series used in the country-specic regressions (Equations (1) and ((2)) are from the
AMECO database, Spring 2009 vintage. In principle, we would only want to consider
data conforming to the ESA 95 accounting system, but since we have some missing data
in some countries for early years, it was also necessary to resort to data conforming to
the ESA 79 standards. In these cases, the series were completed backwards using annual
percentage changes implied in ESA 79 (Table 13 of Appendix C presents a complete list
of ESA 79 data that were used to complete missing data). The variables were afterwards
converted into constant prices using the GDP deator. We computed the measure of
discretionary scal policy volatility for each country and decade for which we have at
least ve observations per decade. The variables used are:
Real primary government expenditure (Equation (1)): Total expenditure
excluding interest in national currency units. Original linked series: UUTGI and
UUTGIF.
Real consumption expenditure (Equation (1)): Final consumption expenditure
of general government in local currency units. Original linked series: UCTGO and
UCTGOF.
Cyclically adjusted primary expenditure (Equation (2)): Primary expenditure
excluding interest adjusted for the cyclical component as percentage of potential GDP.
Original linked series: UUTGBP and UUTGBFP.
Ratio of consumption expenditure (Equation (2)): Final consumption expendi-
ture as percentage of potential GDP. Original linked series: UCTGO and UCTGOF.
GDP (Equation (1)): Real gross domestic product. Original series: UVGD.
Output gap (Equation (2)): Gap between actual and potential GDP as percentage
of potential GDP. Original series: AVGDGP.
Public debt (Equation (2)): General government consolidated gross debt as percent-
age of potential GDP. Original linked series: UDGGL.
Ination (Equation (1)): The proxy for ination is calculated as the rst dierence
44in the logarithm of GDP price deator. Original series: PVGD.
Oil prices (Equation (1)): Logarithm of UK Brent petroleum annual average spot
price. Source: Thomson Reuters.
Panel-data regressions - Equation (7)
Fiscal Governance (1985-2004)
Delegation index: Captures the quality of budget institutions through the three phases:
at the preparation stage, the budget draft is prepared; at the approval stage, the budget
draft is reviewed and approved; and, at the implementation stage, the execution of the
approved budget is scrutinised by the minister of nance and/or by parliament. We
take the scores assigned to each phase of the budget process to construct our measure of
Delegation index from Hallerberg et al. (2007), and Fabrizio and Mody (2008). We have
only selected those items that are common to both papers to ensure harmonisation in the
coding scheme of the three phases. For the former EU-15 countries, the index is based on
information from Hallerberg et al. (2007) for the period 1985-1993, and from that period
onwards, we use Fabrizio and Mody (2008).22 For the CEEC we rely exclusively on
Fabrizio and Mody (2008), who have based their index on data from Fabrizio and Mody
(2006), who in turn had taken institutional scores from Gleich (2003) and Yl aoutinen
(2004).23 The construction of the main index and of its sub-components assumes simple
averages of scores (between 0 and 4) assigned to each phase (Table 11), rescaled to a
range between 0 and 1. The indexes were normalised to have zero mean and standard
deviation equal to 1.
Delegation and commitment dummies: Takes a value of 1 for states where the
budget process is centralised in the nance minister (Delegation) and for states which
have strong numerical budgetary targets shaping the budget process (Commitment). It
takes a value of zero otherwise. The data comes from Annett (2006). It covers the EU
countries (excluding Malta and Cyprus) for the 1981-2004 period.
22Data for France and Ireland are taken from Hallerberg et al. (2007) for all years, since Fabrizio and
Mody (2008) do not provide results for them due to data availability problems.
23They do not cover Cyprus and Malta.
45Table 11: Coding scheme for each phase of the budget process
Preparation Stage Numerical Coding
1. General constraint
Spending and debt as share of GDP 4
Spending as share of GDP or golden rule or limit on public borrowing 3
Balance and debt as share of GDP 2
Balance as share of GDP 1
None 0
2. Agenda setting
MF or PM determines budget parameters to be observed by spending ministers 4
MF proposes nudget norms to be voted on by cabinet 3
Cabinet decides on budget norms rst 2
MF or cabinet collects bids subject to the pre-agreed guidelines 1
MF or cabinet collects bids from spending ministers 0
3. Structure of negotiations
Finance ministry holds bilateral negotiations with each spending ministry 4
Finance ministry holds multilateral negotiations 2
All cabinet members involved together 0
Approval Stage
4. Parliamentary amendments of the budget
Are not allowed, or required to be osetting 4
Do not required to be osetting 0
5. Relative power of the executive vis- a-vis the parliament;
can cause fall of government?
Yes 4
No 0
6. Sequence of votes
Initial vote on total budget size or aggregates 4
Final vote on budget size or aggregates 0
Implementation Stage
7. Procedure to react to a deterioration of the budget decit
due to unforeseen revenue shortfalls or expenditure increase
MF can block expenditures 4
MF cannot block expenditures 0
8. Transfers of expenditures between chapters
(i.e. ministries' budgets)
Not allowed 4
Only possible within departments with MF consent 3.2
Only possible within departments 2.56
Require approval of parliament 1.92
Only if provided for in initial budget or with MF approval 1.28
Limited 0.64
Unlimited 0
9. Changes in the budget law during execution
Only new budgetary law to be passed under the same regulations as the ordinary budget 4
Requires parliament consent 2
At total or large discretion of government 0
10. Carryover of unused funds to next scal year
Not permitted 4
Limited and required authorization by the MF or parliament 2.66
Limited 1.33
Unlimited 0
Source: Hallerberg et al. (2007), and Fabrizio and Mody (2008).
46Numerical Fiscal Rules (1990-2005)
Fiscal rule index: Taken from Debrun et al. (2008), this time-varying index summarises
information on the coverage and strength of national numerical scal rules in force in
the EU countries, except Bulgaria and Romania, over the period 1990-2005.24 It is
calculated by multiplying the share of government nances covered by rules, by an index
of rules' strength based on scores assigned to ve qualitative features: statutory basis,
body in charge of monitoring, body in charge of enforcement, enforcement mechanism,
and media visibility. It was normalised to have zero mean and standard deviation equal
to 1. Its sub-groups, the expenditure rule index and the budget balance and debt rules
index, are built using the same methodology.
Political (1980-2006)
Source: Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 2006 of the World Bank.
Electoral system: The nature of the electoral system takes a value of 1 for governments
elected by proportional representation and 0 by majoritarian circles. Original series: Pr.
Elections: Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in years where a parliamentary
(legislative) election took place and 0 otherwise. For recent years, data on elections were
updated using www.electionsguide.com. Original series: Legelec.
Herndahl index: Measures the concentration of power in the parties. It is calculated
as the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the parliament. Equals NA if there
is no parliament or if there are no parties in the legislature. Original series: Herftot.
Electoral competitiveness: Index of electoral competitiveness that ranges from 1
to 16. Higher values translate into more electoral competitiveness and tighter controls
faced by governments. Original series: Checks.
24The index is based on a survey conducted by the Working Group on the Quality
of Public Finances (WGQPF) of the EC in 2006. In 2008, another survey was car-
ried out to update the previous one, pointing to a slight increase in the number of s-
cal rules in force in EU countries. This data has very recently been made available on
http://ec.europa.eu/economy nance/db indicators/scal governance/scal rules/index en.htm.
47Institutional (1980-2007)
Source: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS).
Government crises: Counts the number of times in a year of any rapidly developing
situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding situations
of revolt aimed at such overthrow. Original series: Domestic4.
Cabinet changes: Counts the number of times in a year that a new premier is
named and/or 50% of the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers. Original series:
Political11.
Macroeconomic (1980-2007)
Source: European Commission AMECO database, Spring 2009 vintage.
GDP per capita: Logarithm of real gross domestic product per capita, measured at
purchasing power parities (PPP). Original series: UVGD and NPTD.
Government size: The ratio of primary government expenditure to GDP at market
prices. Original series: UUTGIF and UUTGI.
Country size: Logarithm of total population. Original series: NPTD.
Dependency ratio: The ratio of population under 15 and over 64 years to the workforce
(those older than 15 and younger than 65). Original series: NPCN, NPON and NPAN.
Openness: The ratio of merchandise trade (exports plus imports) to GDP. Due to lack
of data for Luxembourg for the period 1985-1998, the OECD Economic Outlook No. 86,
November 2009 was used to ll this gap. Original series for exports and imports: DXGT
and DMGT.
Ination: Same variable as used in Equation (1).
Run-up to EMU: Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the former euro area-12
countries over the 1994-1998 period. Greece assumes a value of 1 for the years 1996-2000.
SGP dummy: Dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 for euro area countries after
the year 1998. Greece assumes a value of 1 from 2001 onwards, while Slovenia takes only
a value of 1 in 2007.
New members: Dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 for the 10 Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEEC).
48Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2007)
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) from the World Bank.
Voice and accountability: Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of ex-
pression, freedom of association, and a free media. The scores of this and the following
indicators were normalised to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to 1, ranging
from -2.5 to 2.5 (higher scores corresponding to better outcomes).
Political stability and absence of violence: Capturing perceptions of the likelihood
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
Government eectiveness: Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services,
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
Regulatory quality: Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formu-
late and implement sound policies and regulations that promote private sector develop-
ment.
Control of corruption: Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as
\capture" of the state by elites and private interests.
49C Institutions' quality indexes, data updates and
policy volatility
Table 12: Evolution of the quality of institutions by decade
1980s 1990s 2000s  (2000s -1990s)
Delegation FRI Delegation FRI Delegation FRI Delegation
index index index index
Austria -1.0 -0.8 -0.3 0.4 0.6 1.2 0.9
Belgium -1.4 0.8 -0.5 0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.8
Czech Republic - - - 0.1 0.2 - -
Denmark 0.6 0.7 0.1 2.0 -0.1 1.2 -0.2
Estonia - 0.9 0.8 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.4
Finland -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 1.5 -0.1 1.6 0.3
France 2.2 -0.3 2.2 0.2 1.6 0.6 -0.6
Germany 0.2 1.1 0.2 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
Greece -1.4 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 1.0 0.0 2.0
Hungary - -0.7 -1.8 -0.5 -1.8 0.2 0.0
Ireland -0.5 -0.9 -0.5 -0.7 1.1 0.2 1.7
Italy -2.2 -0.9 -1.0 -0.1 0.3 0.8 1.3
Latvia - -0.4 0.5 -0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0
Lithuania - -0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.2
Luxembourg 0.4 -0.3 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.9 0.7
Malta - - - -0.9 - - -
Netherlands -0.5 0.7 -0.3 1.7 -0.1 1.0 0.3
Poland - -0.2 -0.4 1.3 0.5 1.5 0.9
Portugal -0.4 -0.9 -0.5 -0.6 -0.8 0.2 -0.3
Romania - - - - 0.2 - -
Slovakia - -0.9 -1.7 -0.1 -1.7 0.7 0.0
Slovenia - - - 0.5 -0.3 - -
Spain -2.0 -0.1 -0.5 0.9 -0.1 1.0 0.5
Sweden -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 1.6 1.2 2.1 1.5
United Kingdom 0.8 0.1 1.3 2.3 1.9 2.2 0.6
Correlation 0.293 -0.098
Source: Hallerberg et al. (2007), Debrun et al. (2008), Fabrizio and Mody (2008), and author's
calculations.
Table 13: Use of ESA 79 data
Primary Public CAPE
Expenditure Consumption
Greece 1980-1987 1980-1987 1980-1987
Ireland 1980-1984 1980-1984 1980-1984
Luxembourg 1980-1987* 1980-1989 1980-1989
Spain 1980-1994 1980-1994 1980-1994
Sweden 1980-1992 1980-1992 1980-1992
Note: For each variable we report the time period where ESA 79 was used.
*: for 1988-1989 it was used the OECD Economic Outlook No. 86, November
2009.
































































































































































































































































































































































































Afonso, A. and Furceri, D. (2010), Government Size Composition, Volatility and Eco-
nomic Growth. European Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming.
Afonso, A. and Hauptmeier, S. (2009), Fiscal Behaviour in the EU: Rules, Fiscal Decen-
tralization and Government Indebtedness. ECB Working Paper Series 1054.
Afonso, A., Agnello, L. and Furceri, D. (2010), Fiscal Policy Responsiveness, Persistence,
and Discretion. Public Choice, Forthcoming.
Agnello, A. and Sousa, R. (2009), The Determinants of Public Decit Volatility. ECB
Working Paper Series 1042.
Aisen, A. and Veiga, J. F. (2006), Does Political Instability Lead to Higher Ination? A
Panel Data Analysis. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 38 (5), 1379-1389.
Aisen, A. and Veiga, J. F. (2008), Political Instability and Ination Volatility. Public
Choice 135 (3-4), 207-223.
Alesina, A. (1987), Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (3), 651-678.
Alesina, A. and Bayoumi, T. (1996), The Costs and Benets of Fiscal Rules: Evidence
from U.S. states. NBER Working Paper 5614.
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1996), Fiscal Expansions and Adjustment in OECD
Economies. Economic Policy 21, 205-240.
Annett, A. (2006), Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How Fiscal Policy
Did and Did Not Change Under Europe's Fiscal Framework. IMF Working Paper 116.
Badinger, H. (2008), Fiscal Rules, Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Sta-
bility: An Empirical Assessment for OECD Countries. Applied Economics 41, 829-847.
Blanchard, O. and Perotti, R. (2002), An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic
Eects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 117 (4), 1329-1368.
52CEPR (2010), Completing the Eurozone Rescue: What More Needs to be Done?.
VoxEU.org publication.
Debrun, X., Moulin, L., Turrini, A., Ayuso-i-Casals, J. and Kumar, M. (2008), Tied to
the Mast? National Fiscal Rules in the European Union. Economic Policy 54, 297-362.
European Commission (2006), Public Finances in EMU 2006. European Economy 3.
Fabrizio, S. and Mody, A. (2006), Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indisci-
pline?. Economic Policy 21 (48), 690-739.
Fabrizio, S. and Mody, A. (2008), Breaking the Impediments to Budgetary Reforms:
Evidence from Europe. IMF Working Paper 82.
Fat as, A. and Mihov, I. (2003), The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 118 (4), 1419- 1447.
Fat as, A. and Mihov, I. (2006), The Macroeconomic Eects of Fiscal Rules in the US
States. Journal of Public Economics 90, 101-17.
Fat as, A. and Mihov, I. (2010), The Euro and Fiscal Policy. In: Alesina, A. and Giavazzi,
F., (Ed) Europe and the Euro, pp. 287-326. The University of Chicago Press.
Furceri, D. and Poplawski, M. (2008), Government Spending Volatility and the Size of
Nations. ECB Working Paper Series 924.
Gleich, H. (2003), Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Central and Eastern
European Countries. ECB Working Paper Series 215.
Hallerberg, M., Strauch, R. and von Hagen, J. (2007), The Design of Fiscal Rules and
Forms of Governance in European Union Countries. European Journal of Political
Economy 23, 338-359.
Henisz, W. (2000), The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth. Economics and
Politics 12 (1), 1-31.
Kopits, G. (2001), Fiscal Rules: Useful Policy Framework or Unnecessary Ornament?.
IMF Working Paper 145.
53Lane, P. (2003), The Cyclical Behaviour of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD.
Journal of Public Economics 87 (12), 2661- 2675.
Levinson, A. (1998), Balanced Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence from the States.
National Tax Journal 51.
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., Perotti, R. and Rostagno, M. (2002), Electoral Systems and Public
Spending. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (2), 609-657.
Nordhaus, W. (1975), The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42 (2),
169-190.
Persson, T. (2002), Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?. Econometrica 70
(3), 883-905.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2001), Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What
Are the Stylized Facts?. CEPR Discussion Paper 2872.
Poterba, J. (1994), State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Eects of Budgetary Institu-
tions and Politics. Journal of Political Economy 102, 799-821.
Ramey, G. and Ramey, V. (1995), Cross-Country Evidence on the Link between Volatility
and Growth. American Economic Review 85, 1138-1151.
Rogo, K. and Sibert, A. (1988), Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. Review of
Economic Studies 55 (1), 1-16.
Stokey, N. (2002), \Rules versus Discretion" after Twenty-Five Years. In: Gertler, M.
and Rogo, K., (Ed) NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002, pp.9-45. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Wooldridge, J. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cam-
bridge. MA: The MIT Press.
Wyplosz, C. (2005), Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules. National Institute Economic
Review 191, 70-84.
Yl aoutinen, S. (2004), Fiscal Frameworks in the Central and Eastern European Countries.
Finnish Ministry of Finance Discussion Paper 72.
54Banco de Portugal | Working Papers i
WORKING PAPERS
2008
1/08  THE DETERMINANTS OF PORTUGUESE BANKS’ CAPITAL BUFFERS
  — Miguel Boucinha
2/08  DO RESERVATION WAGES REALLY DECLINE? SOME INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE DETERMINANTS OF 
RESERVATION WAGES
  — John T. Addison, Mário Centeno, Pedro Portugal
3/08  UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND RESERVATION WAGES: KEY ELASTICITIES FROM A STRIPPED-DOWN JOB 
SEARCH APPROACH
  — John T. Addison, Mário Centeno, Pedro Portugal
4/08  THE EFFECTS OF LOW-COST COUNTRIES ON PORTUGUESE MANUFACTURING IMPORT PRICES
  — Fátima Cardoso, Paulo Soares Esteves
5/08  WHAT IS BEHIND THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF PORTUGUESE TERMS OF TRADE?
  — Fátima Cardoso, Paulo Soares Esteves
6/08  EVALUATING JOB SEARCH PROGRAMS FOR OLD AND YOUNG INDIVIDUALS: HETEROGENEOUS IMPACT ON 
UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION
  — Luis Centeno, Mário Centeno, Álvaro A. Novo
7/08  FORECASTING USING TARGETED DIFFUSION INDEXES
  — Francisco Dias, Maximiano Pinheiro, António Rua
8/08  STATISTICAL ARBITRAGE WITH DEFAULT AND COLLATERAL
  — José Fajardo, Ana Lacerda
9/08  DETERMINING THE NUMBER OF FACTORS IN APPROXIMATE FACTOR MODELS WITH GLOBAL AND GROUP-
SPECIFIC FACTORS
  — Francisco Dias, Maximiano Pinheiro, António Rua
10/08  VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION ACROSS THE WORLD: A RELATIVE MEASURE
  — João Amador, Sónia Cabral
11/08 INTERNATIONAL FRAGMENTATION OF PRODUCTION IN THE PORTUGUESE ECONOMY: WHAT DO DIFFERENT 
MEASURES TELL US?
  — João Amador, Sónia Cabral
12/08 IMPACT OF THE RECENT REFORM OF THE PORTUGUESE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ PENSION SYSTEM
  — Maria Manuel Campos, Manuel Coutinho Pereira
13/08 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE BEHAVIOR AND STABILIZING ROLE OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES IN 
THE US
  — Manuel Coutinho Pereira
14/08 IMPACT ON WELFARE OF COUNTRY HETEROGENEITY IN A CURRENCY UNION
  — Carla Soares
15/08 WAGE AND PRICE DYNAMICS IN PORTUGAL
  — Carlos Robalo Marques
16/08  IMPROVING COMPETITION IN THE NON-TRADABLE GOODS AND LABOUR MARKETS: THE PORTUGUESE CASE
  — Vanda Almeida, Gabriela Castro, Ricardo Mourinho Félix
17/08  PRODUCT AND DESTINATION MIX IN EXPORT MARKETS
  — João Amador, Luca David OpromollaBanco de Portugal | Working Papers ii
18/08  FORECASTING INVESTMENT: A FISHING CONTEST USING SURVEY DATA
  — José Ramos Maria, Sara Serra
19/08  APPROXIMATING AND FORECASTING MACROECONOMIC SIGNALS IN REAL-TIME
  — João Valle e Azevedo
20/08  A THEORY OF ENTRY AND EXIT INTO EXPORTS MARKETS
  — Alfonso A. Irarrazabal, Luca David Opromolla
21/08  ON THE UNCERTAINTY AND RISKS OF MACROECONOMIC FORECASTS: COMBINING JUDGEMENTS WITH 
SAMPLE AND MODEL INFORMATION
  — Maximiano Pinheiro, Paulo Soares Esteves
22/08  ANALYSIS OF THE PREDICTORS OF DEFAULT FOR PORTUGUESE FIRMS
  — Ana I. Lacerda, Russ A. Moro
23/08  INFLATION EXPECTATIONS IN THE EURO AREA: ARE CONSUMERS RATIONAL?
  — Francisco Dias, Cláudia Duarte, António Rua
2009
1/09  AN ASSESSMENT OF COMPETITION IN THE PORTUGUESE BANKING SYSTEM IN THE 1991-2004 PERIOD 
  — Miguel Boucinha, Nuno Ribeiro
2/09  FINITE SAMPLE PERFORMANCE OF FREQUENCY AND TIME DOMAIN TESTS FOR SEASONAL FRACTIONAL 
INTEGRATION
  — Paulo M. M. Rodrigues, Antonio Rubia, João Valle e Azevedo
3/09  THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM FOR A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY IN A MONETARY UNION
  — Bernardino Adão
4/09  INTERNATIONAL COMOVEMENT OF STOCK MARKET RETURNS: A WAVELET ANALYSIS
  — António Rua, Luís C. Nunes
5/09  THE INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH OF THE PORTUGUESE BANKING SYSTEM: CHARACTERIZATION AND 
DETERMINANTS
  — Paula Antão
6/09  ELUSIVE COUNTER-CYCLICALITY AND DELIBERATE OPPORTUNISM? FISCAL POLICY FROM PLANS TO FINAL 
OUTCOMES
  — Álvaro M. Pina
7/09  LOCAL IDENTIFICATION IN DSGE MODELS
  — Nikolay Iskrev
8/09  CREDIT RISK AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PORTUGUESE BANKING SYSTEM
  — Paula Antão, Ana Lacerda
9/09  A SIMPLE FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE TO ESTIMATE MODELS WITH HIGH-DIMENSIONAL FIXED 
EFFECTS
  — Paulo Guimarães, Pedro Portugal
10/09  REAL WAGES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE: ACCOUNTING FOR WORKER AND FIRM HETEROGENEITY
  — Anabela Carneiro, Paulo Guimarães, Pedro Portugal
11/09  DOUBLE COVERAGE AND DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE: EVIDENCE FROM QUANTILE REGRESSION
  — Sara Moreira, Pedro Pita Barros
12/09  THE NUMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS, BORROWING COSTS AND BANK COMPETITION
  — Diana Bonﬁ  m, Qinglei Dai, Francesco FrancoBanco de Portugal | Working Papers iii
13/09  DYNAMIC FACTOR MODELS WITH JAGGED EDGE PANEL DATA: TAKING ON BOARD THE DYNAMICS OF THE 
IDIOSYNCRATIC COMPONENTS
  — Maximiano Pinheiro, António Rua, Francisco Dias
14/09  BAYESIAN ESTIMATION OF A DSGE MODEL FOR THE PORTUGUESE ECONOMY
  — Vanda Almeida
15/09  THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF SHOCKS TO WAGES AND PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EURO AREA
  — Rita Duarte, Carlos Robalo Marques
16/09  MONEY IS AN EXPERIENCE GOOD: COMPETITION AND TRUST IN THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF MONEY
  — Ramon Marimon, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Pedro Teles
17/09  MONETARY POLICY AND THE FINANCING OF FIRMS
  — Fiorella De Fiore, Pedro Teles, Oreste Tristani
18/09  HOW ARE FIRMS’ WAGES AND PRICES LINKED: SURVEY EVIDENCE IN EUROPE
  — Martine Druant, Silvia Fabiani, Gabor Kezdi, Ana Lamo, Fernando Martins, Roberto Sabbatini
19/09  THE FLEXIBLE FOURIER FORM AND LOCAL GLS DE-TRENDED UNIT ROOT TESTS
  — Paulo M. M. Rodrigues, A. M. Robert Taylor
20/09  ON LM-TYPE TESTS FOR SEASONAL UNIT ROOTS IN THE PRESENCE OF A BREAK IN TREND
  — Luis C. Nunes, Paulo M. M. Rodrigues
21/09  A NEW MEASURE OF FISCAL SHOCKS BASED ON BUDGET FORECASTS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
  — Manuel Coutinho Pereira
22/09  AN ASSESSMENT OF PORTUGUESE BANKS’ COSTS AND EFFICIENCY
  — Miguel Boucinha, Nuno Ribeiro, Thomas Weyman-Jones
23/09  ADDING VALUE TO BANK BRANCH PERFORMANCE EVALUATION USING COGNITIVE MAPS AND MCDA: A CASE 
STUDY
  — Fernando A. F. Ferreira, Sérgio P. Santos, Paulo M. M. Rodrigues
24/09  THE CROSS SECTIONAL DYNAMICS OF HETEROGENOUS TRADE MODELS
  — Alfonso Irarrazabal, Luca David Opromolla
25/09  ARE ATM/POS DATA RELEVANT WHEN NOWCASTING PRIVATE CONSUMPTION?
  — Paulo Soares Esteves
26/09  BACK TO BASICS: DATA REVISIONS
  — Fatima Cardoso, Claudia Duarte
27/09  EVIDENCE FROM SURVEYS OF PRICE-SETTING MANAGERS: POLICY LESSONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
ONGOING RESEARCH
  — Vítor Gaspar , Andrew Levin, Fernando Martins, Frank Smets
2010
1/10  MEASURING COMOVEMENT IN THE TIME-FREQUENCY SPACE
  — António Rua
2/10  EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND WAGES: EVIDENCE FROM MATCHED FIRM-WORKER-PRODUCT PANELS
  — Pedro S. Martins, Luca David Opromolla
3/10  NONSTATIONARY EXTREMES AND THE US BUSINESS CYCLE
  — Miguel de Carvalho, K. Feridun Turkman, António RuaBanco de Portugal | Working Papers iv
4/10  EXPECTATIONS-DRIVEN CYCLES IN THE HOUSING MARKET
  — Luisa Lambertini, Caterina Mendicino, Maria Teresa Punzi
5/10  COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF BANK MERGERS
  — Pedro P. Barros, Diana Bonﬁ  m, Moshe Kim, Nuno C. Martins
6/10  THE EAGLE. A MODEL FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF MACROECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE EURO AREA
  — S. Gomes, P. Jacquinot, M. Pisani
7/10  A WAVELET APPROACH FOR FACTOR-AUGMENTED FORECASTING
  — António Rua
8/10  EXTREMAL DEPENDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL OUTPUT GROWTH: TALES FROM THE TAILS
  — Miguel de Carvalho, António Rua
9/10  TRACKING THE US BUSINESS CYCLE WITH A SINGULAR SPECTRUM ANALYSIS
  — Miguel de Carvalho, Paulo C. Rodrigues, António Rua
10/10  A MULTIPLE CRITERIA FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE BANK BRANCH POTENTIAL ATTRACTIVENESS
  — Fernando A. F. Ferreira, Ronald W. Spahr, Sérgio P. Santos, Paulo M. M. Rodrigues
11/10  THE EFFECTS OF ADDITIVE OUTLIERS AND MEASUREMENT ERRORS WHEN TESTING FOR STRUCTURAL 
BREAKS IN VARIANCE
  — Paulo M. M. Rodrigues, Antonio Rubia
12/10  CALENDAR EFFECTS IN DAILY ATM WITHDRAWALS
  — Paulo Soares Esteves, Paulo M. M. Rodrigues
13/10  MARGINAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF RANDOM VECTORS GENERATED BY AFFINE TRANSFORMATIONS OF 
INDEPENDENT TWO-PIECE NORMAL VARIABLES
  — Maximiano Pinheiro
14/10  MONETARY POLICY EFFECTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE PORTUGUESE FLOW OF FUNDS
  — Isabel Marques Gameiro, João Sousa
15/10  SHORT AND LONG INTEREST RATE TARGETS
  — Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia, Pedro Teles
16/10  FISCAL STIMULUS IN A SMALL EURO AREA ECONOMY
  — Vanda Almeida, Gabriela Castro, Ricardo Mourinho Félix, José Francisco Maria
17/10  FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC SPENDING VOLATILITY IN EUROPE
  — Bruno Albuquerque